Abstract: There are two typical modes in the e-commerce poverty alleviation supply chain. One is “e-commerce + farmers” mode, where each farmer cooperates with the e-commerce directly as a wholesale price taker. The other is “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers” mode, under which farmers establish a cooperative first and then the cooperate negotiates the wholesale price with the e-commerce. A game model of poverty alleviation supply chain considering the e-commerce’s social responsibility and the cooperative’s cost of management is developed to analyze the operational mechanisms of these two different modes. The optimal choices of both farmers and the e-commerce facing different market conditions are discussed. The results show that: (1) Farmers are more willing to expand the planting area within a cooperative. (2) The lower the cooperative’s cost of management or the higher farmers’ risk aversion, the more likely farmers will choose the “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers” mode. (3) Only when the e-commerce’s degree of social responsibility is weak, will farmers and the e-commerce have the same preference of the mode. More specifically, when the cooperative’s cost of management is relatively low (high), both farmers and the e-commerce will prefer the “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers” mode (the “e-commerce + farmers” mode). When the e-commerce’s degree of social responsibility is strong, farmers and the e-commerce will not have the same preference of the mode. Our analysis leads new managerial insights for the development of e-commerce poverty alleviation.

Key words: e-commerce poverty alleviation, social responsibility, farmer, cooperative, risk-averse