Abstract: The industrialization development of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) projects is an important means for the government to accelerate the realization of future emission reduction targets. Its development requires the cooperation of energy enterprises, financial institutions and other departments under government guidance. As an irrational emotion affecting cooperation, reciprocity preference motivates one party to act not only for its own benefits, but also out of altruism, with the return of other parties in mind. Therefore, this paper introduces reciprocity preference into the evolutionary game model including power producers, CCUS operators and banks to explore the irrational influencing factors and micro mechanism of CCUS industrialization development. The results show that, from the perspective of promoting the industrialization development of CCUS projects, (1) when both power producers and CCUS operators are rational, CCUS operators are less willing to invest in CO₂ transport and storage technologies, and the industrialization development of CCUS projects cannot be achieved; (2) when only power producers have reciprocal preference, there is a reasonable range of reciprocal preference, so that the industrial development of CCUS projects can reach Pareto equilibrium and social resources can be effectively allocated; (3) when only CCUS operators have reciprocal preference, it is also conducive to promote the industrialization of CCUS projects, but compared with the reciprocal preference of power producers, the effect is weak; (4) when both parties have reciprocity preference, "medium and low reciprocity preference of power producers + high reciprocity preference of CCUS operators" is the best scenario. Finally, based on the above conclusions, policy recommendations are given to promote the industrialization development of CCUS projects, with the aim of promoting the healthy development and promotion of CCUS industrialization projects.

Key words: government subsidies, reciprocity preference, industrialization development of CCUS projects, financing, evolutionary game