Abstract: In view of the dual information asymmetry that exists in both moral hazard and adverse selection of third party logistics (3PL), this paper explores how to design the optimal incentive mechanism to induce 3PL to improve supervision quality from the perspective of banks. This paper constructs a single moral hazard model, a menu of contracts and Nash bargaining model under dual information asymmetry, and then analyzes the optimal incentive mechanism of three scenarios and corresponding properties. The results are as follows. (1) Compared with the single moral hazard model, the asymmetric ability information of 3PL reduces the loss-sharing rate borne by 3PL, benefits the 3PL but harms the bank; (2) When bargaining contract is adopted, the loss-sharing rate and effort level of 3PL are related to the gap between its own ability and the average market level, and increase in line with 3PL's ability level; (3) When 3PL's ability endowment is uniformly distributed, the loss-sharing rate of 3PL under the bargaining contract is always larger than that in a menu of contracts. When 3PL's ability level is higher than the average market level, the bargaining contract increases 3PL's loss-sharing rate compared with the single moral hazard model; and (4) When 3PL's ability level is relatively low, bargaining contract can benefit both the bank and the 3PL, and realize the Pareto improvement.

Key words: inventory pledge, moral hazard, adverse selection, third party logistics (3PL), incentive mechanism