Abstract: This paper studies the optimal supply chain decisions and licensing contract in a supply chain with corporate social responsibility. We consider a three-stage game consisting of a patent holder, a brand manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer under CSR investment and information asymmetry. And the influence of the CSR investment on the equilibrium and social welfare of a technology supply chain are analyzed. On this basis, a case of the patent holder assuming CSR and the brand enterprise deciding order quantity and outsourced production price are further considered. It is found that in the patent licensing stage, the patent holder will choose different forms of licensing contracts. And the decisions of manufacturing outsourcing are influenced by the patent licensing. CSR investment may not affect the forms of patent license contract, but the existence of CSR investment leads to the change of the supply chain’s enterprises’ optimal ordering and pricing decision. In conclusion, CSR investment may not decrease the performance of supply chain’s enterprises, but CSR investment is favorable for consumer surplus and social welfare.

Key words: patent licensing, CSR investment, supply chain decisions, three-stage game