Abstract: The quick development of Meituan platform shows that the earning modes becomes more and more important for platform competition. In this paper, we introduce consumers’ sensitivity to delivery time into the two-sided market competition model, and construct a game framework of takeaway platforms, merchants and consumers under four different earning modes, which are based on the access fee mode and two-part tariff mode under unilateral and bilateral charging strategies, respectively, to reveal the optimal earning mode selection and critical conditions of takeaway platforms. The results show that: 1) the choice between the unilateral strategy and the bilateral strategy depends on the earning modes and the competition degree of consumers; 2) the optimal earing mode of takeaway platforms depends on platdforms’ matching ability, market competition intensity, consumers’ delivery time sensitivity, network externalities and platforms’ commission percentage. When a platform’s matching ability is weak and commission percentage is low, the access fees mode under the unilateral strategy is the best for the platform. In contrary, when a platform’s matching ability is not so high or so low, commission percentage is high and the intensity of consumer competition is strong, the two-part tariff mode under the unilateral strategy is the best. When the intensity of consumer competition is weak, the two-part tariff mode under the bilateral strategy is the best.

Key words: delivery time, two-sided market, earning model