Research on the Reward and Punishment Mechanism of Aviation Logistics Infrastructure Construction

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to analyze the impact of reward and punishment mechanism on airline aviation logistics infrastructure construction, an evolutionary game model is constructed to establish the conditions on which game players tend to be in different stable states, and the strategy choices of airlines under different levels of rewards and punishments are analyzed. The results show that the airport operation group has increased the incentives and penalties for airlines, which can change the enthusiasm of airlines' aviation logistics infrastructure construction. Therefore, the airport operation group must not only formulate corresponding medium-and long-term development plans, but also provide necessary guidance for airlines' aviation logistics infrastructure construction; it also needs to formulate corresponding reward and punishment mechanisms to encourage airlines to actively invest in aviation logistics infrastructure construction.

Key words: aviation logistics, infrastructure construction, evolutionary game, reward and punishment mechanism

Jiang Xu, Hu Xueqin. Research on the Reward and Punishment Mechanism of Aviation Logistics Infrastructure Construction[J]. , 2020, 32(4): 231-241.

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