Government Subsidy, Legal Supervision and Local Government Financing Platform's Agency Cost

Abstract

Abstract:

Against the background of the deleveraging policy, regulating local government financing platform operation is important for China's economic development. Based on "Principal-agency Theory", this paper uses the local government financing platforms that issued debt between 2007-2015 to investigate the relationship among government subsidy, legal supervision and local government financing platform's agency cost, and compare difference of this relationship in various local government financing platforms. The results show that government subsidy increases the agency cost of local government financing platforms, decreases the operation efficiency, but legal supervision relieves it. And this phenomenon is more significant in lower level local government financing platforms. Additionally, those relationships are more pronounced where the management has a strong capability or motivation to take opportunist actions.

Key words: government subsidy, agency cost, legal supervision, financing platform

Li Haoyang, Cheng Xiaoke, Li Xinzi. Government Subsidy, Legal Supervision and Local Government Financing Platform's Agency Cost[J]. , 2020, 32(4): 21-34.

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