Chinese Fiscal Decentralization, Group Effect and Economic Growth

Abstract

Abstract:

Within the spatial interaction strategy analysis framework, what effect will the Chinese fiscal decentralization have on the regional economic growth? From the angle of the finance competition among governments, this paper empirically analyzes the effects of strategy interaction features on the government revenues of 232 cities by building spatial Dubin model and multilevel model from the aspects of vertical competition and horizontal competition. The results show that:Chinese fiscal decentralization is different from federal financial system and there is no vertical competition. In order to promote economic growth within a region, vertical competition often compromise on the surface and innovates in system, while the group effects present more in horizontal competition. Regional governments deliberately decrease the tax collection efficiency to promote the economy growth. Prefectural-level governments in the same region prefer the land finance to promote the economy growth, while prefectural-level city governments in different region prefer attracting foreign direct investment and land finance. This paper proposes that the horizontal tax competition between prefecture level cities in different provinces should introduce the horizontal tax competition mechanism while tax competition should be appropriately suppressed prefecture level cities in similar economic development level.

Key words: Chinese fiscal decentralization, tax competition, group effect, economic growth

Huang Siming. Chinese Fiscal Decentralization, Group Effect and Economic Growth[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 250-259.

References

[1] Xie D. Y., Zou H. F., Davoodi H. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in the United States[J]. Cema Working Papers, 1999,45(2):228-239
[2] Oates W. E. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development[J]. National Tax Journal, 1993,46(2):237-243
[3] Avinash D., Olson M. Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the Coase Theorem[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2000,76(3):309-335
[4] Xu C. G. The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development[J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 2011,49(4):1076-1151
[5] 乔宝云,刘乐峥,尹训东,等.地方财政激励制度的比较分析[J].经济研究, 2014,49(10):102-110
[6] Musgrave R. A. The Theory of Public Finance-A Study in Public Economy[M]. New York:MC Graw-Hill, 1959
[7] Tiebout C. M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1956,64(5):416-424
[8] Timothy B., Anne C. Incumbent Behavior:Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition[J].American Economic Review, 1995,85(1):25-45
[9] Allers M. A., Elhorst J. P. Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among Local Governments in the Netherlands[J]. International Tax and Public Finance, 2005,12(4):493-513
[10] Oates W. E. Tax Policy in the Real World[M]. Oxford City:Cambridge University Press, 1972
[11] Keen M. J. Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism[J]. IMF Staff Papers, 1998,45(3):462-471
[12] Lyytikainen T. Tax Competition among Local Governments:Evidence from a Property Tax Reform in Finland[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2012,96(3):584-595
[13] 郭杰,李涛.中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].管理世界, 2009,(11):54-64
[14] 唐飞鹏.省际财政竞争、政府治理能力与企业迁移[J].世界经济, 2016,39(10):53-77
[15] 刘穷志.税收竞争、资本外流与投资环境改善——经济增长与收入公平分配并行路径研究[J].经济研究, 2017,52(3):61-75
[16] 沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效[J].经济研究, 2006,(6):16-26
[17] 李永友,沈坤荣.辖区间竞争、策略性财政政策与FDI增长绩效的区域特征[J].经济研究, 2008,(5):58-69
[18] 谢贞发,范子英.中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竟争[J].经济研究, 2015,50(4):92-106
[19] Qian Y., Roland G. Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J]. American Economic Review, 1998,88(12):1143-1162
[20] 周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究, 2007,(7):36-50
[21] Timothy B., Anne C. Incumbent Behavior:Vote-Seeking Tax-Setting and Yardstick Competition[J]. American Economic Review, 1995,85(1):25-45
[22] 傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界, 2007,(3):4-12
[23] 刘放,杨筝,杨曦.制度环境、税收激励与企业创新投入[J].管理评论, 2016,28(2):61-73
[24] 刘小勇,丁焕峰.邻里竞争、财政分权与政府财政支出偏向研究——基于三层分权框架的角度[J].当代财经, 2015,(7):35-44
[25] 龙小宁,朱艳丽,蔡伟贤,等.基于空间计量模型的中国县级政府间税收竞争的实证分析[J].经济研究, 2014,49(8):41-53
[26] 踪家峰,李蕾,郑敏闽.中国地方政府间标尺竞争——基于空间计量经济学的分析[J].经济评论, 2009,(4):5-12
[27] 黄思明,王乔.税收集权、工业企业规模与发展偏好[J].财政研究, 2018,(5):79-87
[28] Elhorst J. Spatial Econometrics:From Cross-Sectional Data to Spatial Panels[M]. Berlin Heidelberg:Springer-Verlag, 2014
[29] 王小龙,方金金.财政"省直管县"改革与基层政府税收竞争[J].经济研究, 2015,(11):79-93
[30] Keen M. J., Kotsogiannis C. Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?[J]. American Economic Review, 2002,92(1):264-275
[31] 陈真玲.生态效率、城镇化与空间溢出——基于空间面板杜宾模型的研究[J].管理评论, 2016,28(11):66-74
[32] 王宇澄.基于空间面板模型的我国地方政府环境规制竞争研究[J].管理评论, 2015,27(8):23-32
[33] 李敬,陈澍,万广华,等.中国区域经济增长的空间关联及其解释——基于网络分析方法[J].经济研究, 2014,49(11):4-16
[34] 潘文卿.中国的区域关联与经济增长的空间溢出效应[J].经济研究, 2012,47(1):54-65
[35] Allers M., Elhorst J. Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands[J]. International Tax and Public Finance, 2005,12(4):493-513
[36] 龙志和,李伟杰.空间面板数据模型Bootstrap Moran'sⅠ检验[J].统计研究, 2014,31(9):97-101
[37] Soto M. System GMM Estimation with a Small Sample[J]. UFAE and IAE Working Paper, 2010,7(8):80-90
[38] 汪冲.资本集聚、税收互动与纵向税收竞争[J].经济学(季刊), 2012,11(1):19-38