Regional Cooperative Strategies for Emergency Response to Accidents and Disasters under Longitudinal Administrative Constraint——Case Study in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region

Abstract

Abstract:

With the rapid urbanization and expanding cities, accidents and disasters turn to "transboundary crises", to which a consensus is reached that governments inside a specific region should conduct regional cooperative emergency response. Based on evolutionary game theory, the present paper sets up an adaptive strategy choice model with the longitudinal administrative constraint, with which the impacts of longitudinal administrative constraint are studied and the strategy choice and evolutionary path of regional governments are researched. The results are twofold:(1) stronger longitudinal administrative constraint leads to higher probabilities for the formation of the regional coping strategies to accidents and disasters. However, longitudinal administrative constraint may be faced with "malfunction dilemma" if the national government provides limited reward; (2) differences among local places of economy, economic structure and the reserve and dispatch of emergency resource should be taken into well consideration by national government to figure out the different roles acted by local governments. Case study and numerical simulation for the cooperation of administrations in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region to accidents and disasters verifies all the findings.

Key words: longitudinal administrative constraint, accidents and disasters, evolutionary game, regional cooperative management

Qiu Ying, Shi Xianliang, Hua Guowei. Regional Cooperative Strategies for Emergency Response to Accidents and Disasters under Longitudinal Administrative Constraint——Case Study in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 240-249.

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