Effects of Intergovernmental Competition and Government Scale Expansion on Carbon Welfare Performance

Abstract

Abstract:

In an attempt to explain the effect of local government behavior on both regional welfare and environmental protection and find out whether it is dual consideration or selective neglect, this study introduces the concept of carbon welfare performance and empirically analyzes the dynamic data of Chinese provinces from 1990 to 2014 via a robust clustering two-way fixed effect model and a generalized method of moments model to research the effect of local government behavior on carbon welfare performance. We try to interpret, from a new perspective, what impacts the behaviors of local governments bring to low carbon performance and people's livelihood. The results from data regression indicate that the intergovernmental competition leads to the deterioration of the regional environmental quality but also the improvement of regional welfare, and regional welfare is improved more significantly than carbon emission is affected, thus contributing to the promotion of carbon welfare performance. Government scale expansion not only leads to the deterioration of the regional environmental quality but also leave regional welfare ignored, thus counteracting the promotion of carbon welfare performance. Both intergovernmental competitions and governmental scale expansion have a "complementary relationship" to the collective effects of carbon welfare performance, which provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the "pollution paradise" hypothesis and the theory of "bottom competition". Further study concludes that there is a significant regional heterogeneity in the effects of intergovernmental competition and government scale expansion on carbon welfare performance. The intergovernmental competition has a greater impact on the performance of the carbon welfare than the government scale expansion in the eastern region, yet the impact of intergovernmental competition between the central and western regions is weaker than that of the government scale expansion. This paper suggests that the promotion mechanism of performance-oriented officials based on the regional carbon welfare performance, and the encouragement and supervision to local government should be strengthened from the central government and the government should formulate regional development policies that take into account the dual objectives of environmental protection and welfare promotion, and build an ecological civilization system and promote harmonious development between mankind and the nature.

Key words: carbon welfare performance, intergovernmental competition, government scale expansion, carbon emission, local welfare

Wang Lei, Zhao Zhongchao, Liu Xinmin. Effects of Intergovernmental Competition and Government Scale Expansion on Carbon Welfare Performance[J]. , 2019, 31(4): 263-282.

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