Study of the Effects of Asset Specificity on Family Business Performance

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper examines the effects of asset specificity on family business performance and the adjustment effects of family governance on the relationship between asset specificity and firm performance. Based on the data of 2010-2013 listed family companies as research samples, we find that:asset specificity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with business performance in family business. Family ownership and the landlord authority have positive adjustment effects on the relationship between asset specificity and firm performance. When asset specificity is at a high level, family owner's altruism can generate negative adjustment effects. Our further study finds that weak institutional environment can strengthen positive adjustments of family ownership and landlord authority. The adjustment effects of governance of family business above are not so pronounced under stronger institutional environment, indicating that there is supplementary relationship between outside governance mechanism and family governance mechanism. This paper enriches the research literature on asset specificity and firm performance, and also helps understand the underlying mechanism between family governance and firm performance.

Key words: family governance, asset specificity, firm performance

Jin Xie, Qiu Yizheng. Study of the Effects of Asset Specificity on Family Business Performance[J]. , 2018, 30(10): 221-237.

References

[1] Penrose E. The Theory of the Firm[J]. Haivard Business Review, 1959,68(3):79-93
[2] Lippman S. A., Rumelt R. P. Uncertain Imitability:An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982,13(2):418-438
[3] 黄敏,雷新途. 中国农林企业资产专用性经济后果研究——来自沪,深农林上市公司的经验证据[J]. 改革与战略, 2011,27(6):167-170
[4] 寿志钢. 专有资产的非对称性和总量对关系绩效的影响——定制化合同和嵌入式关系的中介作用[J]. 经济管理, 2012,34(8):144-153
[5] Balakrishnan S., Fox I. Asset Specificity, Firm Heterogeneity and Capital Structure[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1993,14(1):3-16
[6] Mocnik D. Asset Specificity and a Firm's Borrowing Ability:An Empirical Analysis of Manufacturing Firms[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2001,45(1):69-81
[7] Jap S. D. Pie-expansion Efforts:Collaboration Processes in Buyer-supplier Relationships[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1999,36(4):461-475
[8] Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1997,52(2):737-783
[9] Collis D. J., Montgomery C. A. Corporate Strategy:Resources and the Scope of the Firm[M]. Chicago:Irwin, 1997
[10] 李青原,陈晓,王永海. 产品市场竞争,资产专用性与资本结构——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2007,28(4a):100-113
[11] Heide J. B., Stump R. L. Performance Implications of Buyer-supplier Relationships in Industrial Markets:A Transaction Cost Explanation[J]. Journal of Business Research, 1995,32(1):57-66
[12] De Vita G., Tekaya A., Wang C. L. Asset Specificity's Impact on Outsourcing Relationship Performance:A Disaggregated Analysis by Buyer-supplier Asset Specificity Dimensions[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2010,63(7):657-666
[13] 汪涛,秦红. 专用性投资对机会主义的影响——以汽车行业4S专营店为例[J]. 管理科学, 2006,19(2):22-32
[14] 雷新途. 我国企业资产专用性研究——来自制造业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2010,53(1):101-106
[15] 于茂荐,孙元欣. 专用性投资,治理机制与企业绩效——来自制造业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理工程学报, 2014,28(1):39-47
[16] 于茂荐,孙元欣. 专用性投资对企业绩效影响研究——产业技术投入的调节效应[J]. 科学学研究, 2012,30(9):1363-1369
[17] 程新生,孙毅,刘翰. 控股股东行为,资产专用性与企业成长性——来自云南白药的案例研究[J]. 经济与管理研究, 2012,33(2):22-31
[18] Lui S. S., Wong Y., Liu W. Asset Specificity Roles in Interfirm Cooperation:Reducing Opportunistic Behavior or Increasing Cooperative Behavior?[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2009,62(11):1214-1219
[19] 曾楚宏,朱仁宏. 资产专用性视角下的纵向一体化与企业政治行为[J]. 财经科学, 2012,56(7):60-68
[20] 王明琳,周生春. 控制性家族类型,双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J]. 管理世界, 2006,22(8):83-93
[21] Daily C. M., Dollinger M. J. An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms[J]. Family Business Review, 1992,5(2):117-136
[22] Fama E. F., Jensen M. C. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26(2):327-349
[23] Barontini R., Caprio L. The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance:Evidence From Continental Europe[J]. European Financial Management, 2006,12(5):689-723
[24] Schulze W. S., Lubatkin M. H., Dino R. N. Agency Relationships in Family Firms:Theory and Evidence[J]. Organization Science, 2001,12(2):99-116
[25] Dyer J. H. Effective Interfirm Collaboration:How Firms Minimize Transaction Costs and Maximize Transaction Value[J]. Strateg Manage Journal, 1997,18(7):535-56
[26] Luo Y. Partnering with Foreign Firms:How Do Chinese Managers View the Governance and Importance of Contracts?[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2002,19(1):127-151
[27] Vilasuso J., Minkler A. Agency Costs, Asset Specificity, and the Capital Structure of the Firm[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2001,44(1):55-69
[28] 李青原,王永海. 资产专用性与公司资本结构——来自中国制造业股份有限公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2006,27(7):66-71
[29] 李婧,贺小刚,连燕玲,等. 业绩驱动,市场化进程与家族企业创新精神[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(1):96-108
[30] 刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海. 控制权,业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J]. 管理世界, 2004,20(8):102-110
[31] 刘峰,钟瑞庆,金天. 弱法律风险下的上市公司控制权转移与"抢劫"——三利化工掏空通化金马案例分析[J]. 管理世界, 2008,24(12):106-116
[32] Williamson O. E. The Economic Intstitutions of Capitalism[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster, 1985
[33] Williamson O. E. Credible Commitments:Using Hostages to Support Exchange[J]. The American Economic Review, 1983,73(4):519-540
[34] Coase R. H. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica, 1937,4(16):386-405
[35] Lemmon M. L., Lins K. V. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value:Evidence from The East Asian Financial Crisis[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2003,58(4):1445-1468
[36] 张华,张俊喜,宋敏. 所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J]. 经济学, 2004,3(B10):1-14
[37] 许永斌,彭白颖. 控制权,现金流权与公司业绩——来自中国民营上市公司的经验研究[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2007,27(4):74-79
[38] 王鹏,周黎安. 控股股东的控制权,所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2006,27(2):88-98
[39] 冯旭南,李心愉,陈工孟. 家族控制、治理环境和公司价值[J]. 金融研究, 2011, 32(3):149-164
[40] 刘建梅,程昱,苑翠然. 关联交易,资产专用性与控股股东行为——基于仁和与天目的案例研究[J]. 管理案例研究与评论, 2012,5(2):97-104
[41] 陈建林. 上市家族企业管理模式对代理成本的影响——代理理论和利他主义理论的争论和整合[J]. 管理评论, 2012,24(5):53-59
[42] Andres C. Large Shareholders and Firm Performance——An Empirical Examination of Founding-family Ownership[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008,14(4):431-445
[43] 何晓斌,陈笑,成功. "权"与"利"的力量:民营企业创始人传承意愿形成的核心因素[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2014,1(6):43-54
[44] 王明琳,陈凌,叶长兵. 中国民营上市公司的家族治理与企业价值[J]. 南开管理评论, 2010,13(2):61-67
[45] Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J. P. H. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2002,57(6):2741-2771
[46] 雷新途,李世辉. 资产专用性、声誉与企业财务契约自我履行:一项实验研究[J]. 会计研究, 2012,29(9):59-66
[47] Hwang P. Asset Specificity and the Fear of Exploitation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006,60(3):423-438
[48] Faccio M., Lang L. H. P. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,65(3):365-395
[49] Daily C. M., Dollinger M. J. An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms[J]. Family Business Review, 1992,5(2):117-136
[50] Schulze W. S., Lubatkin M. H., Dino R. N. Toward a Theory of Agency and Altruism in Family Firms[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2003,18(4):473-490
[51] 苏启林. 代理问题,公司治理与企业价值——以民营上市公司为例[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,22(4):100-106
[52] 毕艳杰. 上市公司家族控制与公司绩效关系的实证分析[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2006,22(4):45-56
[53] 李新春. 经理人市场失灵与家族企业治理[J]. 管理世界, 2003,21(4):87-95
[54] Karra N., Tracey P., Phillips N. Altruism and Agency in the Family Firm:Exploring the Role of Family, Kinship, and Ethnicity[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2006,30(6):861-877
[55] Burkart M., Panunzi F., Shleifer A. Family firms[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2003,58(5):2167-2202
[56] Block J. H., Jaskiewicz P., Miller D. Ownership Versus Management Effects on Performance in Family and Founder Companies:A Bayesian Reconciliation[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2011,2(4):232-245
[57] Johnson S., Porta R. L., Lopez-De-Silanes F. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,90(2):22-27
[58] 吕长江,肖成民. 民营上市公司所有权安排与掏空行为[J]. 管理世界, 2006,24(10):128-138
[59] 沈艺峰,况学文,聂亚娟. 终极控股股东超额控制与现金持有量价值的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2008,11(1):15-23
[60] Claessens S., Djankov S., Lang L. H. P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58(1):81-112
[61] 刘峰,贺建刚. 股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择——中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[J]. 中国会计评论, 2004,2(1):141-158
[62] 贺建刚,孙铮,李增泉. 难以抑制的控股股东行为:理论解释与案例分析[J]. 会计研究, 2010,31(3):20-27
[63] John K., Litov L., Yeung B. Corporate Governance and Risk-taking[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2008,63(4):1679-1728
[64] 苏启林,朱文. 上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J]. 经济研究, 2003,49(8):36-45
[65] 黄志忠,张娟,王剑秋,等. 基金业绩影响因素研究——基于基金经理特征视角[J]. 会计与经济研究, 2012,26(1):60-67
[66] 李青原. 资产专用性与公司纵向并购财富效应[J]. 南开管理评论, 2011,14(6):116-127
[67] 周煜皓,张盛勇. 金融错配、资产专用性与资本结构[J]. 会计研究, 2014,35(8):75-80
[68] 程宏伟. 隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,22(8):105-111
[69] 方明月. 资产专用性、融资能力与企业并购——来自中国A股工业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2011,31(5):156-170
[70] 贺小刚,李婧,张远飞,等. 创业家族的共同治理有效还是无效?——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(6):150-161
[71] Lin Z. J., Liu M. The Effects of Managerial Shareholdings and Corporate Governance on Aduit Fees:Evidence from HongKong[C]. 中国会计学会2010年学术年会论文集-审计与内部控制, 2010
[72] North D. C. A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics[J]. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1990,2(4):355-367
[73] Amit R. H., Ding Y., Villalonga B. The Role of Institutional Development in The Prevalence and Value of Family Firms[C]. Finance and Corporate Governance Conference, 2010
[74] 樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏. 中国市场化指数——各省区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2011