Abstract: The ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has gradually exhibited a trend towards diversification, with absence of actual controllers as a typical feature in this context. Utilizing A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 as the sample, this paper studies the economic consequences of companies without actual controllers from the perspective of excessive financialization. The empirical results indicate that absence of actual controllers leads to excessive financialization, but institutional investors, as an effective supervisory entity, can weaken the inducing effect. Mechanism tests show that absence of actual controllers amplifies the power of managers and weaken the quality of corporate governance, leading to excessive financialization. Heterogeneity tests discover that absence of actual controllers has a more significant impact on excessive financialization in companies audited by a non-Big-Four accounting firm, with poor internal control, and located in a region with a low degree of marketization. Moreover, the consequence tests indicate that excessive financialization in companies without actual controllers serves as a tool for managers to seek private interests and results in the under-performance of core business. This study supplements the researches on the driving factors of corporate financialization, and has important reference for improving the governance mechanism of companies without actual controllers, guiding companies to allocate financial assets reasonably, and promoting the high-quality development of Chinese listed companies.

Key words: absence of actual controllers, excessive financialization, agency theory