Abstract: As one of the key development areas in new infrastructure, the operational capabilities of operators are a significant factor affecting the healthy development of China's charging market for new energy vehicles. The establishment of charging platforms provides a space for matching the supply and demand between charging pile operators and users. However, due to the uneven operational and maintenance capabilities of charging operators within the platform, operators with low capabilities tend to free-ride, damaging the economic interests of operators with high capabilities. This can lead to the tragedy of the commons within the charging platform. Therefore, this study adopts a platform economy perspective to examine the interactions among charging operators with heterogeneous operational and maintenance capabilities within charging platforms. Utilizing game theory and public goods theory, a public goods game model is constructed to analyze the decision-making behaviors of different charging operators regarding the enhancement of their operational capabilities and to identify key influencing factors. The research reveals that spontaneous cooperation among charging operators is insufficient to resist the invasion of operators employing the hitchhiking strategy. Increasing population density and learning range promote a gradual shift from cooperation to hitchhiking strategy among operators, while an expanded migratory range fosters the formation of stable spatial clusters by operators choosing the cooperation strategy. This research offers important insights for improving the operational capabilities of charging operators within charging platforms, fostering the healthy development of charging platforms and markets, and realizing the construction objectives of new infrastructure projects.

Key words: public chargers, new infrastructure, operational decision-making, public goods game, platform economy