Management Review ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 239-252.

• Public Management • Previous Articles    

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Farmers Green Production Behavior Based on Consumer Green Preferences

He Qilong1,2, Wang Qingren3, Li Qinying1, Luo Xing1, Tang Juanhong4   

  1. 1. Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001;
    2. School of Politics and Public Administration, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001;
    3. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ;
    4. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072
  • Received:2022-06-27 Published:2025-05-06

Abstract: China is a large country with a huge number of smallholder farmers, who are the main body of agricultural production, so motivating them to shift toward green production is the key for China to get on the trajetory of green agricultural development, and it is also a systematic revolution. Pro-green consumers’ demand for green products is the fundamental force driving the overall green transformation of agriculture. The key depends on whether the demand can be transmitted to the production side and transformed into more green production behaviors of farmers. In reality, the production behavior of farmers is characterized by complex dynamic evolution within the group based on social learning and maximizing expected returns. This paper introduces the Moran process of biomes strategy renewal, simulates the social learning mechanism of farmers’ green production decision-making, and analyzes the conditions under which farmers’ green production strategies become evolutionarily stable strategies driven by consumers’ green preferences for farmers with different choice intensities. The results show that: (1) under any selection intensity, consumers’ green preference, farmers’ green awareness and government’ s ecological compensation positively encourage farmers’ green production, while the cost coefficient of green production negatively inhibits farmers’ green production; (2) under weak selection dominated by random factors, as long as the ecological subsidy is greater than the green production cost, it is beneficial for the green production to replace the general production strategy for any population; (3) under any selection intensity, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the greenness of agricultural products and the boundary conditions of green production strategy taking root; (4) after satisfying the corresponding boundary conditions, if the population size is greater than the corresponding critical value, the green production strategy of farmers will be dominant, and as consumer green preferences increase, this critical value gradually decreases. In summary, it is feasible to realize the systematic revolution of green agricultural transformation guided by market demand, and government participation (such as subsidies and publicity) can further give play to the market power.

Key words: consumer green preference, evolutionary game, Moran process, green production behavior