The Influence of the Dual Allocation of Family Control Rights and Corporate Control Rights on the High-quality Development of Family Firms

Abstract

Abstract: Family firm is a special organization composed of family system and enterprise system. The differences in kinship and shareholder relationship involve the family in different configurations of control rights, which affects the strategy and behavior of the family firm, especially in guiding the high-quality development and transformation of the enterprise. Based on the differentiation of internal relationships in family firms, this study analyzes the influence of dual-level control allocation on the high-quality development of family firms, so as to deepen the extension and application of corporate governance theory and agency theory in family firms. The empirical results of the sample of listed family firms from 2010 to 2018 show that the decentralized or highly centralized allocation of control rights within the family can bring positive results, while the allocation of control rights at the firm level should be accompanied with moderately introducing non-family related shareholders. The dual-level allocation of control rights has a certain complementary effect on the high-quality development of enterprises. Dual-level control right allocation has different effects on the high-quality development of family firms, and stable external environment, low financing constraints and direct establishment of family firms will strengthen this effect. The findings of this study provide new thinking for analyzing the influence of family relations and understanding the two-tier governance structure of family enterprises.

Key words: family firms, allocation of control rights, high quality development

Sun Xiufeng, Zhang Wenlong, Feng Baojun. The Influence of the Dual Allocation of Family Control Rights and Corporate Control Rights on the High-quality Development of Family Firms[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(4): 156-170.

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