Abstract: At present, supply chain resilience has become an important factor affecting the stable connection between farmers and supermarkets, as well as the long-term development of the supply chain. Analysis shows that the game between farmers and supermarkets faces a “prisoner’s dilemma”, where the decision of the investing party is influenced by the decision of the non-investing party, and even free riding behavior occurs. The probability of the evolutionary game evolving towards the direction where neither party invests is higher. Therefore, this paper introduces the government as the governance party to strengthen the guidance of resilient investment behavior, and establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the government, supermarkets and farmers, with the government as the regulatory body. At the same time, the concept of “resilience benefit value” is proposed and a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, farmers and supermarkets is introduced. By discussing the evolution trend of the “Farming-Supermarket” Docking system and analyzing the final stable evolution strategy, this study investigates the factors that affect the resilience investment decisions of farmers and supermarkets, as well as the different regulatory strategies adopted by the government. It analyzes the probability of farmers and supermarkets adopting corresponding resilience investment behaviors under different regulatory strategies adopted by the government, and proposes countermeasures and suggestions for the government to govern the resilience investment behavior of “Farming-Supermarket” Docking, empowering the government to promote resilience development. The government’s adoption of reasonable governance measures can encourage both farmers and supermarkets to actively engage in resilience investment, thereby forming a positive interaction among the government, farmers and supermarkets. The conclusions and suggestions have reference value for resisting current disturbance risks and potential destructive emergencies, and improving the resilience of the “Farming-Supermarket” Docking supply chain.

Key words: “Farming-Supermarket” Docking, supply chain resilience, resilience investment, evolutionary game, evolutionary stability strategy