Abstract: In view of the manufacturers’ greenwashing problem disrupting the market order of green supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model for consumers’ environmental behavior choices and manufacturers’ green production decision under Sales Platform Eco-labels (i.e. SPE-labels) - a disclosure tool for emerging environmental policy. A supervision mechanism between platform and consumer is established to guard against manufacturers’ greenwashing, and the important factors affecting manufacturers’ behavior and supervision intensity are analyzed. The results show that consumers’ green behavior and manufacturers’ production decisions are mainly affected by utility discounts, the total of reputational rewards and punishments, and the gap between product costs. Specifically, when consumers are more concerned about green products and give reputational rewards and punishments actively, greenwashing will get controlled effectively. Therefore, in order to give play to the linkage role of the e-commerce platforms and the consumers, this paper introduces a platform-consumer joint supervision model to explore the evolutionary stability strategy under the platform-consumer cooperative supervision. The gap between the costs, between the benefits and the total fines under loose supervision, and the reputational rewards and punishments under joint supervision model are critical factors which affect the equilibrium of evolutionary games. The evolution time of the equilibrium strategy can be shortened by increasing platform information transparency, improving responsiveness to consumer complaints, and increasing penalties. This paper provides some inspiration and suggestions for the decision makers in e-commerce market.

Key words: Sales Platform Eco-labels, greenwashing, supervision mechanism, evolutionary game