Management Review ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 52-63.

• Economic and Financial Management • Previous Articles    

Whose Vitality Is Inspired by Mixed Ownership Reform?

Li Mingshan1, Sun Xiaohua2, Guan Shu3   

  1. 1. Center for Industrial and Business Organization, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024;
    3. School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026
  • Received:2021-06-07 Published:2025-01-18

Abstract: As an essential step of “comprehensively deepening reform” in the new era, “stimulating the vitality of market participants” is clearly required in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee. Given the vigorous development of all kinds of market participants, it is necessary to discuss the effect of mixed ownership reform on enterprises under different ownership structures. In this paper, we theoretically explain the differential effects of mixed ownership reform on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) by constructing a mixed oligopoly model, and then use a panel data from China’s provinces as the empirical sample. It is found that, mixed ownership reform significantly promotes the economic vitality of non-SOEs, with relieved financing constraints serving as a crucial pathway. The impact of mixed ownership reform on the economic vitality of SOEs exhibits a nonlinear effect. In the early stages of reform, economic vitality in SOEs is primarily stimulated by shedding policy burdens. However, as the reform enters deep waters, blindly reducing the proportion of the state-owned economy will not contribute to boosting the economic performance of SOEs. To further explore the mechanism of how mixed ownership reform influences SOEs, we examine the effects of the new round of mixed ownership reform of SOEs, represented by categorical reform, using microdata from local state-owned listed companies in the commercial category. It is found that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs indirectly improves the economic performance of SOEs by reducing two types of agency costs, without inhibiting SOEs from their social responsibilities such as providing jobs. The above conclusions not only provide empirical evidence for the policy evaluation of mixed ownership reform, but also provide a theoretical basis for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new era.

Key words: mixed ownership reform, vitality of market participants, SOE’s reform toward mixed ownership, categorical reform