Abstract: In the context of negative externalities of emerging technologies, it is of great significance to explore the strategy evolution rules of enterprises, public and government in the process of implementing responsible innovation to build a long-term mechanism for jointly implementing responsible innovation. Based on evolutionary game theory and prospect theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model. The results show that: The government plays the role of advocator, promoter and gatekeeper in the initial stage of responsible innovation development, growth stage and mature internalization stage. The government should constantly adjust the reward and punishment mechanism so that the sum of the reward and punishment for all parties is greater than the cost of participation of all parties. The tripartite stabilization strategy finally evolves into responsible innovation implemented by technology enterprises, participated by the public and minumally intervened by the government. Government subsidy and cost of science and technology enterprises have a significant impact on the decision-making of enterprises and the public, but a small impact on the government decision. The initial state of technology enterprises has a significant impact on the convergence rate of government strategy evolution. Both the initial state of the public and the government have a significant influence on the convergence rate of the strategy evolution of technology enterprises. Moderately improving the value perception and loss aversion sensitivity of decision makers will help the government to actively intervene in order to form a good interaction between all parties.

Key words: responsible innovation, multi-agent behavior, evolutionary game, long-term mechanism