Abstract: A two-stage game model for the regulation of “patent unqualified agency” in e-commerce platforms is constructed based on the theory of dynamic new collaborative regulation. The game evolution process and stable strategies of merchants, e-commerce platforms, and the government are systematically analyzed. The effective path for regulating the behavior of “patent unqualified agency” is studied through simulation. The results indicate that: (1) the stability strategy of the first stage game without government participation does not meet expectations. In the second stage, after coordinated supervision between the government and the platform, the tripartite game can reach an ideal evolutionary stable state; (2) with the participation of the government, improving the professionalism of e-commerce platforms, the accuracy of government “Internet plus” regulation, fines for unqualified agents, and e-commerce interview losses can promote the rapid evolution of the tripartite game to an ideal stable state; (3) the best regulatory measures to promote the evolution of the system to an ideal stable state with government participation vary depending on the regulatory targets. For merchants, direct regulation is more effective than indirect regulation, and for e-commerce platforms, in-process regulation is more effective than post regulation.

Key words: digital economy, patent unqualified agency, e-commerce platforms, two-stage evolutionary game