Abstract: Where should companies go under the pandemic? As important decision makers, managers are caught in the dilemma of balancing short-term benefits and long-term development, and myopia fluctuations become more and more obvious. Based on managerial cognition and resource dependence theory, this paper constructs myopia fluctuation indexes by using all A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2020 to explore the impact of managerial power on myopia fluctuations and the moderating effect of ownership, slack resources and manager tenure. The results show that managerial power has a significant negative effect on myopia fluctuations. The ownership and slack resources have a negatively moderating effect between managerial power and myopia fluctuations, while manager tenure has a positively moderating effect between managerial power and myopia fluctuations. The findings extend the application of managerial cognition and resource dependence theory, enrich the related literature of managerial power on myopia fluctuations, expand the context from the perspectives of ownership, slack resources and manager tenure, and provide practical guidance for avoiding myopia fluctuations and stabilizing decision-making horizon under the pandemic.

Key words: managerial power, managerial myopia fluctuations, nature of ownership, slack resources, manager tenure