Abstract: To analyze the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in a typical information asymmetric market of peer-to-peer online lending, this paper develops a three-party evolutionary game model including lending platforms, industry associations and investors. Regarding joining an industry association as a reputation signal, it focuses on analyzing the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the system. Empirical data are collected to verify the reputation-enhancing effect of the industry association. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of reputation mechanism in online lending platforms depends on the certification and screening carried out by third-party institutions, i.e., the active screening by industry associations directly affects the proportion of online lending platforms operating in a self-regulatory manner as well as the survival of the group, and serves as an effective mechanism to achieve an equilibrium separation of high- and low-risk platforms. The empirical results of the coarsened exact matching method reveal that joining industry associations reflects a certain amount of reputation information, which indeed helps platforms strengthen their reputation and thus directly improves the survival of lending platforms. The intermediary effect model supports that the industry association enables the function of social capital empowerment and motivates platforms to apply for and obtain fund depository provided by commercial banks.

Key words: industry associations, reputation, social capital, peer-to-peer lending platform, game theory