Abstract: Based on the perspective of resource dependence theory, using the samples of A-share listed subsidiaries from 2011 to 2021, this paper focuses on the relationship between subsidiary reputation and parent company' expropriation, and the moderating effect of subsidiary director horizontal interlocks. It is found that subsidiary reputation has a significant inhibitory effect on parent company' expropriation. The two dimensions of subsidiary reputation:generalized favorability and being known, both have negative effects on parent company' expropriation, but the governance effect of generalized favorability is significantly stronger than that of being known. The subsidiary director horizontal interlocks strengthen the negative correlation between subsidiary reputation and parent company' expropriation. In an extended research, this paper explores the mechanism of how subsidiary reputation affects parent company' expropriation, and finds that subsidiary reputation inhibits parent company' expropriation by improving shareholder value and analysts' attention. Grouping the ultimate ownership attributes and industry characteristics of subsidiaries, this paper tests the governance effects of subsidiary reputation, and finds that there is no significant difference between the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Compared with the samples of non-high-tech industries, high-tech subsidiary reputation plays a more significant role in inhabiting parent company' expropriation. This research enriches the research of firm reputation in the field of corporate governance, expands the application of resource dependence theory in the context of parent-subsidiary companies, and provides empirical evidence and theoretical reference for alleviating the effect of parent company' expropriation and protecting the interests of minority shareholders.

Key words: firm reputation, parent company' expropriation, resource dependence theory, director horizontal interlocks