Abstract: Based on legitimacy theory and agency cost theory, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of ultimate controlling owners’ political, economic and their dual incentives on CSR reports. The paper puts forward substantive indicators such as data of pages, pictures, charts and digital information to measure CSR reports. The results indicate that the higher the political incentive ultimate controlling owners receive, the more inclined their corporations are to release CSR reports and the more substantial content will be disclosed in CSR reports. Further, the higher level of economic incentive ultimate controlling owners receive, the less inclined their corporations are to release CSR reports. Even if they do, less substantial content will be disclosed in CSR reports. In particular, when ultimate controlling owners are faced with both political and economic incentives, their corporations tend to release CSR reports, but the content of the reports are less substantial. This study enriches the researches on CSR reports’ content, and traces the research object to ultimate controlling owners of the corporations along the corporate governance chain, thus laying a foundation for in-depth analysis of the fundamental motivation of CSR disclosure behavior.

Key words: political incentive, economic incentives, political connections, degree of equity separation, corporate social responsibility report