Abstract: Based on the M&A events of state-owned listed companies in 2007-2016, this paper analyzes and tests the impact of nonstate-owned shareholders' governance effect on the state-owned enterprises'(SOEs') M&A performance. The results show that:firstly, the deeper the non-state-owned shareholders participate in governance, the better the SOEs' M&A performs; secondly, active participation in voting is beneficial for shareholders to give full play to the role of check and balance, and improve the level of M&A performance; thirdly, if no director is appointed to a SOE, the check and balance effect of non-state-owned shareholders becomes less effective; fourthly, reducing inefficient M&A transactions and improving the quality of integration after M&A are important channels through which nonstate-owned shareholders act on SOEs' M&A performance; fifthly, compared with foreign investors and private investors, institutional investors play a bigger role of governance. The above conclusions show that the introduction of non-state-owned capital is conducive to the improvement of SOEs' M&A performance. In the process of mixed ownership reform, the threshold for non-state-owned shareholders to enter the SOEs could be further reduced, and their corresponding rights (such as the right to vote and the right to appoint directors) should be guaranteed, so that different types of capital can participate in the internal governance activities equally, and improve the operating efficiency of SOEs jointly.

Key words: M&A performance, non-state-owned shareholders, checks and balance, director appointment, mixed ownership reform