Abstract: This paper aims to explore the low-price tour regulation under a reward-punishment mechanism and tourist participation by establishing a dynamic evolutionary game model among the local tour operators, tourists and the government. The model is calculated and simulated in the NetLogo platform. Findings suggest that: (1) If the government imposes higher penalty on illegal local tour operators, less local tour operators would choose low-rice tour groups. However, simply intensifying the penalties does not make it sure for local tour operators to choose normal-price tour groups. (2) When tourists complain about the service of the low-price tour groups, the illegal local tour operators should compensate the tourists. Increasing the compensation will motivate tourists to make complaints and thus would inhibit the low-price tour. (3) The subsidy provided by the government to local tour operators should be in the range (v1,v2). Any subsidy below v1 is not attractive enough for local travel operators to choose normal-price tour groups, while any subsidy above v2 would increase the financial burden of the government, so any subsidy beyond the range is not conducive to the overall optimization of the system. (4) Tourists’ complaints can make it a trend for local tour operators to choose normal-price tour groups. When the government’ incentives for tourists’ complaints reach a certain level, tourists’ complaint motivation will be improved significantly.

Key words: low-price tour, government regulation, reward-punishment mechanism, evolutionary game, NetLogo simulation