Abstract: In terms of commercial bank risk transfer, the bank shareholders, depositors and creditors would lead to moral hazard behaviors due to deposit insurance system. But existing literature has not fully given attention to this subject. This paper selects 289 banks in 17 countries of Euro-zone from 2000 to 2015 for the research. The research framework consists of bank shareholders, depositors and creditors, combines the change of deposit insurance system in times of crisis, and uses the dynamic panel regression method (GMM) to test the relationship between risk-taking and the bank performance under deposit insurance system. The results show,that:(1) the Euro-zone banks have the behavior of transferring risk to creditors. During the time of crisis, the behavior of government guarantee could strengthen the market expectation of implicit guarantee. (2) Also due to the weakening of risk constraint over shareholders, creditors are willing to put up with risks. (3) The improvement of deposit insurance system has no significant influence on bank performance. (4) In terms of countries implementing government guarantee in the crisis, there is significant positive correlation between the ratio of non-deposit debt and the shareholder returns. The behavior of government could improve the return of bank shareholders on investment through reducing its return on capital, which also reflects the weakening price constraint over banks by non-deposit creditors. Based on the research findings, we expand the research area of deposit insurance system on commercial banks' moral hazard. It could help to identify risk-taking behavioral logicality of the market participants under deposit insurance system. And it also has important practical significance for establishing improved deposit insurance system and developing more targeted risk-control strategies in China.

Key words: deposit insurance system, risk-taking, bank performance, moral hazard, risk transfer