Management Review ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (7): 313-325.

• Public Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

The Resident-Government Agent Game Analysis of NIMBY——Based on the Perspective of Fairness Perception

Li Yadong1, Zou Anqiong2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031;
    2. School of Public Affairs & Law, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031
  • Received:2018-05-24 Online:2021-07-28 Published:2021-08-02

Abstract: This paper builds a resident-government agent game model with fairness perception. It tries to abstract the negotiation between resident and government as a multi-stage game based on the benefits of agents in NIMBY problem, to find the equilibrium of optimal compensation strategy. We further combine case analysis and numerical simulation to explain the results. Our study shows that:(1) Resident's expectation compensation increases with the degree of correlation between the total social benefit and the project scale and the degree of improvement of the project hazard, decreases with the number of resident project benefit. The optimal government compensation increases with the degree of improvement of project hazards, decreases with the degree of correlation between the total social benefits and the project, increases with the number of resident project benefit. (2) The higher the project harmfulness, the greater the public psychological loss and the devaluation of fixed assets, and the longer the non-cooperation time, the lower the resident's optimal expectation compensation. (3) The resident's adjusted optimal expected compensation will also increase with the government performance, tax revenue and project profits, and the government compensation should also increase with it. However, the greater the impact of project hazards on the number of damaged residents, the higher the resident's expected compensation in the next round of game, the lower the compensation the government should pay. (4) The expectation of distance-sensitive public for optimal compensation is relatively low and increases with fair perception; the expectation of distance-insensitive public for optimal compensation is higher and decreases with fair perception. (5) Government compensation is slightly higher than the public expectations, and the government should give the distance-insensitive public lower compensation, but the compensation increases with the public's fair concern; the distance-sensitive public should be given higher compensation and decrease with the fair concern, so as to maintain the fairness of compensation. These results have important practical reference for the government to control the cost of compensation and to solve the NIMBY conflict.

Key words: solution to NIMBY conflict, fairness perception, resident-government agent game, optimal compensation