Abstract: With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are engaged in low-carbon efforts and sell products through dual channel. Existing researches only focus on low-carbon or coordination in a dual-channel supply chain, while ignoring dual-channel supply chain coordination contracts with low-carbon efforts. In view of this: (1) This paper considers the manufacturer’s low-carbon efforts, and establishes a dual-channel supply chain game model to solve the equilibrium decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer under the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. It finds that the manufacturer prefers wholesale price contract, and the retailer prefers revenue sharing contract. Compared to the revenue sharing contract, the overall profit of the supply chain and the low-carbon efforts of the manufacturer are higher under the wholesale price contract, but the above contracts cannot coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. (2) The revenue-sharing contract with compensation designed in this paper can realize the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain, and the compensation amount depends on the relative bargaining power of the manufacturer and the retailer. (3) This paper explores the impact of demand shift, consumer environmental awareness and relative bargaining power on member profits and manufacturer’s low carbon efforts. It is found that in the face of market changes, the manufacturer is more agile and the retailer’s response is more effective.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, low-carbon effort, wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract, coordination contract