Executive Power, Internal Control and SOEs' Expense Classification Shifting

Abstract

Abstract: Using the data of two years pre-Eight Rules and two years post-Eight Rules, the paper empirically researches whether executive power could influence SOEs' expense classification shifting and the governance effect of internal control. This paper finds that SOEs' expense classification shifting within the firms with bigger executive power is more serious, internal control can reduce the positive relation between executive power and SOEs' expense classification shifting. Classification, SOEs' expense classification shifting within the firms which have longer CEO tenure, CEO also is the chairman and CEO selected from inside is more serious. The robust test does not change the empirical result. The results indicate that executive power can enhance SOEs' expense classification shifting, especially when executive power is free from supervision and constraint.

Key words: executive power, internal control, expense classification shifting, perquisite consumption, external supervision

Fu Shaozheng. Executive Power, Internal Control and SOEs' Expense Classification Shifting[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(1): 269-277.

References

[1] 叶康涛,臧文佼. 外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(1):121-128
[2] 卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖. 管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J]. 南开管理评论, 2008,17(5):85-92
[3] 权小锋,吴世农,文芳. 管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J]. 经济研究, 2010,45(11):73-87
[4] 张铁铸,沙曼. 管理层能力、权力与在职消费研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014,23(5):63-72
[5] McVay S. E. Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting:An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 2006,81(3):501-531
[6] Barua A., Lin S., Sbaraglia A. M. Earnings Management Using Discontinued Operations[J]. The Accounting Review, 2010,85(5):1485-1509
[7] Fan Y., Barua A., Cready W. M., et al. Managing Earnings Using Classification Shifting:Evidence from Quarterly Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 2010,85(4):1303-1323
[8] Lee L. F. Incentives to Inflate Reported Cash from Operations Using Classification and Timing[J]. The Accounting Review, 2012,87(1):1-33
[9] Behn B. K., Gotti G., Herrmann D., et al. Classification Shifting in an International Setting:Investor Protection and Financial Analysts Monitoring[J]. Journal of International Accounting Research, 2013,12(2):27-50
[10] Lail B. E., Thomas W. B., Winterbotham G. J. Classification Shifting Using the "Corporate/Other" Segment[J]. Accounting Horizons, 2014,28(3):455-477
[11] Fan Y., Liu X. K. Misclassifying Core Expenses as Special Items:Cost of Goods Sold or Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2017,34(1):400-426
[12] Haw I., Ho S. S. M., Li A. Y. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management by Classification Shifting[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2011,28(2):517-553
[13] Joo J. H., Chamberlain S. L. The Effects of Governance on Classification Shifting and Compensation Shielding[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2017,34(4):1779-1811
[14] 吴溪. 盈利指标监管与制度化的影响:以中国证券市场ST公司申请摘帽制度为例[J]. 中国会计与财务研究, 2006,8(4):95-137
[15] 张子余,张天西. "特殊损失项目"与"核心费用"之间的归类变更盈余管理研究[J]. 财经研究, 2012,38(3):70-80
[16] 林芳,冯丽丽. 管理层权力视角下的盈余管理研究——基于应计及真实盈余管理的检验[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2012,34(7):96-104
[17] 谢盛纹,田莉. CEO权力、审计行业专长与税收激进度[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2014,24(5):31-39
[18] 刘锦,王学军,张三保,等. CEO非正式权力、正式权力与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2015,27(11):161-169
[19] 傅颀,汪祥耀. 所有权性质、高管货币薪酬与在职消费——基于管理层权力的视角[J]. 中国工业经济, 2013,(12):104-116
[20] Bebchuk L. A., Fried J. M. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003,17(3):71-92
[21] 梅洁,葛扬. 国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究——基于2012年"八项规定"出台所构建的拟自然实验[J]. 经济学家, 2016,28(2):75-83
[22] 王治,张皎洁,郑琦. 内部控制质量、产权性质与企业非效率投资——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2015,27(9):95-107
[23] 张春龙,张国梁. 高管权力、现金股利政策及其价值效应[J]. 管理评论, 2017,29(3):168-175
[24] 谭庆美,魏东一. 管理层权力与企业价值:基于产品市场竞争的视角[J]. 管理科学, 2014,26(3):1-13
[25] 刘银国,张琛. 自由现金流与在职消费——基于所有制和公司治理的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2012,24(10):18-25
[26] 徐细雄,刘星. 放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(3):119-132
[27] 刘慧龙,王成方,吴联生. 决策权配置、盈余管理与投资效率[J]. 经济研究, 2014,49(8):93-106
[28] 宋德舜. 国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(3):91-98
[29] Liang S., Zhao G., Wang N. Managers' Personal Characteristics, Bank Supervision, and Cost Stickiness[J]. China Accounting and Finance Review, 2015,17(4):70-97