Does Financing Channels of the Largest Shareholder Affect Enterprise Innovation? ——Evidence from Equity Pledge

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the theory of agency, this paper explores the impact of largest shareholder's stock pledge on the corporate innovation and the difference of this relationship between enterprises with different property rights and enterprises with different manager types. As shown by the empirical evidences, it is found that the corporate innovation is significantly inhibited when the largest shareholder's shares are pledged. Moreover, the influence of the largest shareholders' equity pledge in the non-state-owned enterprises is more serious than that in the state-owned enterprises. Compared with the corporations without affiliated management, equity pledge of the largest shareholder has more serious impact in the enterprise with affiliated management. This research enriches the empirical evidence of the second kind of agency problem from the perspective of equity pledge. Besides that, it also provides a reference for the increasingly popular phenomenon of equity pledge and the Chinese economy in the transition period.

Key words: equity pledge, enterprise innovation, ownership, manager types, second agency problem

Li Shu, Zhai Shiyun, Sun Lanlan, Gu Pu. Does Financing Channels of the Largest Shareholder Affect Enterprise Innovation? ——Evidence from Equity Pledge[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(10): 120-134.

References

[1] Tan J., Tang Y. Donate Money, but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights, Agency Problems, and Corporate Philanthropy in China[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2016,134(4):593-610
[2] Lin C., Ma Y., Malatesta P., et al. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice between Bank Debt and Public Debt[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2013,109(2):517-534
[3] 朱德胜,周晓珮. 股权制衡、高管持股与企业创新效率[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(3):136-144
[4] Boone A. L., White J. T. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015,117(3):508-533
[5] 窦欢,陆正飞. 大股东代理问题与上市公司的盈余持续性[J]. 会计研究, 2017,(5):24-31
[6] 孔东民,刘莎莎. 中小股东投票权、公司决策与公司治理——来自一项自然试验的证据[J]. 管理世界, 2017,(9):101-115
[7] 甄红线,张先治,迟国泰. 制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J]. 金融研究, 2015,(12):162-177
[8] 陈德萍,陆星廷. 股权质押与盈余管理的关系研究——基于创业板上市公司的实证检验[J]. 会计研究, 2017,(5):39-44
[9] 谢德仁,廖珂,郑登津. 控股股东股权质押与开发支出会计政策隐性选择[J]. 会计研究, 2017,(3):30-38
[10] 张瑾华,何轩,李新春. 银行融资依赖与民营企业创新能力——基于中国企业家调查系统数据的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(4):98-108
[11] 李新功. 政府R&D资助、金融信贷与企业技术创新[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(12):54-62
[12] 郭韬,任雪娇,赵丽丽. 关系型融资对创新型企业R&D投资影响的门槛效应研究——基于信息不对称和融资结构的门槛视角[J]. 管理评论, 2017,29(7):61-69
[13] 谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜. 控股股东股权质押是潜在的"地雷"吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(5):128-140
[14] 郝项超,梁琪. 最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么?[J]. 会计研究, 2009,(7):57-63
[15] Lev B., Sougiannis T. The Capitalization, Amortization, and Value-Relevance of R&D[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1996,21(1):107-138
[16] Dasgupta P., Stiglitz J. Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity[J]. Economic Journal, 1980,90(358):266-293
[17] Chan S. H., Martin J. D., Kensinger J. W. Corporate Research and Development Expenditures and Share Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,26(2):255-276
[18] Shi C. On the Trade-Off between the Future Benefits and Riskiness of R&D:A Bondholders' Perspective[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2003,35(2):227-254
[19] Stein J. C. Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1988,96(1):61-80
[20] 姚靠华,唐家财,蒋艳辉. 研发投入、研发项目进展与股价波动——基于创业板上市高新技术企业的实证研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013,21(1):205-213
[21] Firth M., Lin C., Liu P., et al. Inside the Black Box:Bank Credit Allocation in China's Private Sector[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009,33(6):1144-1155
[22] Brandt L., Li H. B. Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies:Ideology, Information or Incentives?[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003,31(3):387-413
[23] Cull R., Xu L. C. Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2003,71(2):533-559
[24] Brandt L., Zhu X. Redistribution in a Decentralized Economy:Growth and Inflation in China under Reform[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2000,108(2):422-439
[25] 潘红波,韩芳芳. 纵向兼任高管、产权性质与会计信息质量[J]. 会计研究, 2016,(7):19-26
[26] 郑杲娉,薛健,陈晓. 兼任高管与公司价值:来自中国的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2014,(11):24-29
[27] 彭小平,龚六堂. 控股股东的掏空行为与公司的股权结构及公司价值——基于双层委托代理模型的分析[J]. 中国会计评论, 2011,(3):259-282
[28] Wang K., Xiao X. Controlling Shareholder's Tunneling and Executive Compensation:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2011,30(1):89-110
[29] Fama E. F., Jensen M. C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26(2):301-325
[30] 吴超鹏,唐菂. 知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效——来自中国上市公司的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2016,(11):125-139
[31] 朱沆,Eric Kushins,周影辉. 社会情感财富抑制了中国家族企业的创新投入吗?[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(3):99-114
[32] Balsmeier B., Fleming L., Manso G. Independent Boards and Innovation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016,123(3):536-557
[33] Mukherjee A., Singh M., Žaldokas A. Do Corporate Taxes Hinder Innovation?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2017,124(1):195-221
[34] 谭燕,吴静. 股权质押具有治理效用吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2013,(2):45-53
[35] 李旎,郑国坚. 市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J]. 会计研究, 2015,(5):42-49
[36] 郑国坚,林东杰,林斌. 大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014,17(9):72-87
[37] Cohen D. A., Zarowin P. Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management Activities around Seasoned Equity Offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2010,50(1):2-19
[38] 罗琦,王悦歌. 真实盈余管理与权益资本成本——基于公司成长性差异的分析[J]. 金融研究, 2015,(5):178-191
[39] Kim J., Li Y., Zhang L. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk:Firm-level Analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011,100(3):639-662
[40] 许年行,江轩宇,伊志宏,等. 分析师利益冲突、乐观偏差与股价崩盘风险[J]. 经济研究, 2012,(7):127-140
[41] Sunder J., Sunder S. V., Zhang J. Pilot CEOs and Corporate Innovation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2017,123(1):209-224
[42] 张陶勇,陈焰华. 股权质押、资金投向与公司绩效——基于我国上市公司控股股东股权质押的经验数据[J]. 南京审计学院学报, 2014,11(6):63-70