›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 242-253.

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Optimal Online Referral Strategy and Incentive Mechanism in Offline to Online (O2O) Supply Chain

Jin Liang1,2   

  1. 1. Research Center of the Central China for Economic and Social Development, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031
  • Received:2017-03-27 Online:2019-05-28 Published:2019-05-31

Abstract:

Focusing on the offline to online (O2O) supply chain composed of an online retailer and a showroom, a principal-agent model based on game theory is established to optimize the design of incentive mechanism. The aim is to design the optimal commission contract and online referral effort and analyze the effect of online retailer's referral on the commission contract, profits of both partners and information value. The results show that, under certain conditions, online referral is able to improve the online retailer's expected profit and O2O supply chain's performance, and also decrease the retailer's loss due to asymmetric information. Meanwhile, to adjust the offline evaluate service based on the online referral, online referral does not always decrease the showroom's expected profit. Finally, a numerical example is given to illuminate the optimal commission contract and profits of both partners.

Key words: O2O supply chain, online referral, asymmetric information, commission contract