Multi-homing, Merger of Internet Platform Enterprises and Total Social Welfare

Abstract

Abstract:

Based on two-sided market theory and in the case of considering users' behavior of multi-homing, the impact of Internet platform enterprises' horizontal merger and the prohibition against multi-homing after the merger on total social welfare are studied. The existence of multi-homing users helps improve total social welfare. If there are more multi-homing users, total social welfare will be better improved after enterprises' horizontal merger. If platform enterprises prohibit users' behavior of multi-homing after the merger, total social welfare is very likely to decrease. The antitrust regulator is advised to keep tolerant to platform enterprises' behavior of horizontal merger. However, but pay more attention to the proportion of multi-homing users and enterprises' behavior of prohibiting users' multi-homing.

Key words: platform enterprises, multi-homing, horizontal merger, total social welfare, antitrust regulation

Xie Yunbo, Chen Hongmin. Multi-homing, Merger of Internet Platform Enterprises and Total Social Welfare[J]. , 2018, 30(8): 115-125.

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