A Game-theory Based Research on the Protection and Management of Ecological Water in Xinjiang Inland Area

Abstract

Abstract:

Over exploitation of water resources is one of the main reasons for the deterioration of ecological environment in inland region.As irrigated area expands and raw land gets over developed, more and more ecological water is being persistently occupied at no cost for agricultural use.Therefore, a pressing task for Xinjiang inland regions is to reduce the amount of agricultural water and increase the eco-logical water.This paper studies Xinjiang ecological water by using a game theory model and researches the strategies of farmers and local governments from different perspectives.The results show that local governments should inflict more serious punishment on farmers who use too much ecological water and develop better water-saving technologies;the autonomous region government should give some prefer-ential policies to local governments who don't squeeze ecological water resources and promote mutual cooperation between local govern-ments, thus laying a solid foundation for a more sustainable use of ecological water.The research of this paper can provide a reference for the local governments of Xinjiang to establish a scientific and effective water protection and management mechanism, and give some ideas for the study of ecological water protection in arid and semiarid regions of China.

Key words: ecological water protection and management, complete information, static game, dynamic game, evolutionary game

Ma Xueliang, Li Chao, Zhao Qingmei, Long Aihua, Qiao Han. A Game-theory Based Research on the Protection and Management of Ecological Water in Xinjiang Inland Area[J]. , 2017, 29(7): 235-243.

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