Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016

Abstract

Abstract:

The Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2016 was awarded jointly to economists Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their contributions to contract theory. We review Hart's contributions to incomplete contracts and Holmström's contributions to complete contracts. Building up the optimal incentive contracts and choosing the suitable allocation of property rights can help safeguard the social division of labor cooperation and thus promote the development of economy. This paper summarizes the academic contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström in contract theory, and introduces the contributions of contract theory for the development of our society.

Key words: the Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, contract theory, complete contract theory, incomplete contract theory

Yan Yan, Liu Yi. Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 3-10.

References

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