环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析

›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 226-236.

环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析

陈真玲¹, 王文举²

1. 河南财经政法大学经济学院/中原经济区"三化"协调发展河南省协同创新中心, 郑州 450046;
2. 北京物资学院, 北京 101149

收稿日期:2015-11-01 出版日期:2017-05-28 发布日期:2017-05-26
通讯作者: 王文举,北京物资学院院长,博士生导师
作者简介:陈真玲,河南财经政法大学经济学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目（14ZDA072）；本文系河南省哲学社会科学规划项目阶段性成果（2016BJJ070）；河南省科技厅软科学项目（172400410099）；河南财经政法大学重点学科建设项目。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments and Polluting Firms Considering Environmental Tax Regulation

Chen Zhenling¹, Wang Wenju²

1. College of Economics/Henan Collaborative Innovation Center for Coordinating Industrialization, Urbanization and Agriculture Modernization in Central Economic Zone, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450046;
2. Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149

Received:2015-11-01 Online:2017-05-28 Published:2017-05-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在环境税制背景下，从微观主体的收益函数出发，本文构建了中央政府与地方政府的委托代理模型、政府与污染企业的演化博弈模型，并对三者的利益互动博弈关系进行了仿真模拟和深入分析，从中探究合理的环境税征收的设计机制。研究结果表明：（1）在环境税的监管机制下，当政府补贴大于企业减排成本时，政府与污染企业的博弈稳定策略实现了帕累托最优。（2）随着中央政府对地方政府税收共享比例的提高，地方政府对污染企业的监管力度也会加大，因此制定合理的环境税共享比例有助于调动地方政府积极性，从而实现污染企业节能减排。（3）加大监管力度和提高环境税率将会促进污染企业减少排放，但是一旦监管力度下降，即使提高环境税率，污染企业不会全部采取减排策略。污染企业将出现两极分化，一部分企业选择不减排策略，另一部分企业选择减排策略。因此制定严格的环境污染监督机制势必将推动污染企业积极减排、促进经济绿色发展。

关键词: 环境税, 委托代理模型, 演化博弈

Abstract:

Based on the game theory, this paper constructs two revenue functions of micro subject models:the principal-agent model relating to the central government and local governments, and the evolutionary game model relating to the government and pollution enterprises. We also analyze and simulate their intrinsic interest relations in the relation among the central &local governments and the enterprises. The reason findings show that:Firstly, the evolutionary stable strategy between the governments and polluting firms can achieve the Pareto optimality in the condition of environmental tax when the subsidy is greater than the cost. Secondly, it is significant to increase the share ration of tax revenue between the central and local governments which can improve the local government's supervision of pollution firms. Thirdly, when we strengthen environmental regulation and increase environmental tax, pollution emission will decrease. However, once environmental regulation is relaxing, polluting firms will not adopt pollution abatement strictly though we increase environmental tax. polluting firms will have two choices:Some firms are unwilling to reduce pollution, others will choose the strategy of pollution reduction. So, it is important to stipulate the reasonable mechanism of environmental tax which can promote actively pollution abatement of firms, and economic green development.

Key words: environmental tax, the principal-agent model, the evolutionary game

陈真玲, 王文举. 环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J]. , 2017, 29(5): 226-236.

Chen Zhenling, Wang Wenju. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments and Polluting Firms Considering Environmental Tax Regulation[J]. , 2017, 29(5): 226-236.

参考文献

[1] 刘凤良,吕志华. 经济增长框架下的最优环境税及其配套政策研究——基于中国数据的模拟运算[J]. 管理世界, 2009,(6):40-49
[2] 贾康,王桂娟. 以税制绿化和碳税开启新一轮中国环境税制改革[J]. 开放导报, 2011,157(4):20-22
[3] 余伟,陈强,陈华. 不同环境政策工具对技术创新的影响分析——基于2004-2011年我国省级面板数据的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(1):53-61
[4] Alexeev A., Good D. H., Krutilla K. Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend in Decentralized Jurisdictions[J]. Ecological Economics, 2016,122(2): 90-100
[5] Oueslati W. Environmental Tax Reform: Short-Term versus Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects[J]. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2014,40(6)190-201
[6] Rausch S., Schwarz G. A. Household Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Distributional Impacts of Environmental Taxes[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2016,138(6):43-57
[7] Zhao R., Zhou X., Han J., et al. For the Sustainable Performance of the Carbon Reduction Labeling Policies under an Evolutionary Game Simulation[J]. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2016,112:262-274
[8] Tian Y., Govindan K., Zhu Q. A System Dynamics Model based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion among Chinese Manufacturers[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2014,80(7):96-105
[9] Barari S., Agarwal G., Zhang W. J. (Chris), et al. A Decision Framework for the Analysis of Green Supply Chain Contracts: An Evolutionary Game Approach[J]. Expert Systems with Applications, 2012,39(3):2965-2976
[10] 李新然,陈蓉. 基于政府基金政策的再制造闭环供应链最优决策研究[J]. 管理评论, 2015,27(10):183-194
[11] Cohen M. C., Lobel R., Perakis G., et al. The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption[J]. Management Science, 2016,62(5):1235-1258
[12] Hu G., Wang L., Chen Y., et al. An Oligopoly Model to Analyze the Market and Social Welfare for Green Manufacturing Industry[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2014,85:94-103
[13] Franckx L. Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2005,30(2):195-220
[14] Dong X., Li C., Li J., et al. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Implementation of Cleaner Production Policies in the Chinese Electroplating Industry[J]. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 2010,54(12):1442-1448
[15] Zhao R., Neighbour G., Han J. J., et al. Using Game Theory to Describe Strategy Selection for Environmental Risk and Carbon Emissions Reduction in the Green Supply Chain[J]. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2012,25(6):927-936
[16] Wu B., Liu P. F., Xu X. F. An Evolutionary Analysis of Low-Carbon Strategies based on the Government Enterprise Game in the Complex Network Context[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017,141:168-179
[17] 申亮. 我国环保监督机制问题研究:一个演化博弈理论的分析[J]. 管理评论, 2011,23(8):46-51
[18] 李媛,赵道致,祝晓光. 基于碳税的政府与企业行为博弈模型研究[J]. 资源科学, 2013,35(1):125-131
[19] 于维生,张志远. 中国碳税政策可行性与方式选择的博弈研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2013,23(6):8-15
[20] 李长胜,范英,朱磊. 基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012,20(2):94-101
[21] 郭本海,方志耕,刘卿. 基于演化博弈的区域高耗能产业退出机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012,20(8):79-85
[22] 王维国,王霄凌. 基于演化博弈的我国高能耗企业节能减排政策分析[J]. 财经问题研究, 2012,(4):75-82
[23] 张学刚,钟茂初. 政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2011,21(2):31-35
[24] 潘峰,西宝,王琳. 地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2014,24(6):97-102
[25] 李明全,王奇. 基于双主体博弈的地方政府任期对区域环境合作稳定性影响研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2016,26(3):83-88
[26] 谢晶晶,窦祥胜. 基于合作博弈的碳配额交易价格形成机制研究[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(2):15-24
[27] 潘峰,西宝,王琳. 基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015,35(6):1393-1404
[28] 郭志仪,姚慧玲. 环境税相关主体利益的博弈及其制度安排[J]. 税务研究, 2011,(7):37-39
[29] Friedman D. Evolutionary Games in Economics[J]. Econometrica, 2010,59(3):637-666
[30] 徐晓亮. 资源税税负提高能缩小区域和增加环境福利吗?——以煤炭资源税改革为例[J]. 管理评论, 2014,26(7):29-36
[31] 姚昕,刘希颖. 基于增长视角的中国最优碳税研究[J]. 经济研究, 2010,45(11):48-58
[32] 乔晗,李自然. 碳税政策国际比较与效率分析[J]. 管理评论, 2010,22(6):85-92