基于市场机制的流域管理PPP模式项目契约研究

›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 197-206.

基于市场机制的流域管理PPP模式项目契约研究

常亮^1,2, 刘凤朝², 杨春薇²

1. 大连理工大学物理与光电工程学院, 大连 116024;
2. 大连理工大学管理与经济学部, 大连 116024

收稿日期:2015-01-13 出版日期:2017-03-28 发布日期:2017-03-30
作者简介:常亮,大连理工大学物理与光电工程学院党委副书记兼副院长,大连理工大学管理与经济学部博士后,博士;刘凤朝,大连理工大学管理与经济学部教授,博士生导师;杨春薇,大连理工大学管理与经济学部办公室职员,硕士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71173026；71273038）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（15YJC880002）；辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目（L13BJY016）；大连市社科联（社科院）一般（联合）课题（2013dlskybdl010）。

Research of Watershed Management PPP Project Contract Based on the Market Mechanism

Chang Liang^1,2, Liu Fengchao², Yang Chunwei²

1. School of Physics and Optoelectronic Technology, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024;
2. Faculty of management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024

Received:2015-01-13 Online:2017-03-28 Published:2017-03-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 西方国家的研究与实践表明，PPP模式是一种行之有效的公共管理与公共服务市场化手段；因此，PPP模式对于推动我国流域管理的市场化发展具有积极借鉴意义。基于契约理论和委托代理理论，构建了流域管理PPP模式项目契约Holmstrom-Milgrom模型，以此重构流域管理市场化过程中政府与市场主体间的角色定位和利益关系。模型分析和数值模拟表明，适度将第三方监督写入流域管理PPP模式项目契约，可以降低委托代理成本，提高契约弹性，降低道德风险。最后，提出了政策建议。

关键词: 流域管理, 公共管理与服务市场化, PPP模式, 契约, Holmstrom-Milgrom模型

Abstract: It has been proved that the PPP mode is a kind of mature and effective mechanism of marketization in public service (administration) by foreign practice, and it has a positive use for reference significance to promote Chinese watershed management marketization. Based on contract theory, the paper builds up watershed management PPP project Holmstrom-Milgrom model, and reconstructs the main role and interest relationship between the government and the market body in the process of watershed management marketization. Studies have shown that it could effectively reduce principal-agent cost and improve the flexibility and benefits of the project contract when the third party supervision is wrote in watershed management PPP project contract. Finally, it puts forward policy recommendations.

Key words: watershed management, market of public management and services, contract, PPP mode, Holmstrom-Milgrom model

常亮, 刘凤朝, 杨春薇. 基于市场机制的流域管理PPP模式项目契约研究[J]. , 2017, 29(3): 197-206.

Chang Liang, Liu Fengchao, Yang Chunwei. Research of Watershed Management PPP Project Contract Based on the Market Mechanism[J]. , 2017, 29(3): 197-206.

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