管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (6): 205-215.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于供应商回购激励的供应链投融资协调策略

窦亚芹, 白少布, 储俊   

  1. 南京工程学院经济与管理学院, 南京 211167
  • 收稿日期:2014-02-11 出版日期:2016-06-28 发布日期:2016-07-07
  • 作者简介:窦亚芹,南京工程学院经济与管理学院副教授,博士;白少布,南京工程学院高等教育研究所教授,博士;储俊,南京工程学院经济与管理学院副教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社科青年基金项目(13YJCZH201);南京工程学院在职博士科研资助项目(ZKJ201512);南京工程学院创新基金项目(CKJB201212;CKJC201509)。

Coordination Strategies of Investing and Financing in Supply Chain Based on Suppliers' Repurchase Incentives

Dou Yaqin, Bai Shaobu, Chu Jun   

  1. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167
  • Received:2014-02-11 Online:2016-06-28 Published:2016-07-07

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摘要：

考虑回购激励、延迟支付和批发价等多种契约机制以及破产风险因素,研究了供应商和资金约束零售商组成的二级供应链中商业信用融资与营运投资的综合协调决策问题。文章比较分析了集中决策下资金约束零售商分别选择商业信用融资和银行贷款时供应链的最优采购量策略,并基于自身利润最大化的经济行为假设,研究了分散决策下处于Stackelberg博弈主导地位的供应商运用多个契约设计实现供应链联合利润和自身利润最优。研究表明,供应链集中决策情形下,无多余自由现金的供应商从银行贷款为零售商提供商业信用比零售商自身从银行贷款创造的供应链价值更高;供应链分散决策情形下,供应商可以通过商业信用和回购激励与零售商分担存货融资成本及存货需求不确定性风险,激励零售商订购与集中决策时集成供应链相同的最优采购量,且供应商可以通过批发价策略调整供应链联合利润的分享比例。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了验证,并提出了管理启示。

关键词: 商业信用, 营运投资, 回购激励, 破产风险, 供应链协调

Abstract:

Considering the impact of buyback incentives, delayed payments, wholesale price and bankruptcy risk factor, we study coordinated decision-making problems between commercial credit financing and supply chain operations investment in thetwo-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer with cash constraints in this paper. We comparatively analyze optimal purchase strategies in supply chain when a capital-constrained retailer selects trade credit financing and bank loans under centralized decision-making. Based on the hypothesis of economic behavior of maximization profit of their own, we research how the dominant supplier in Stackelberg Game under decentralized decision-making situation adopts multi-contract design to achieve optimal profits of supply chain and its own. Our results show that gain of integrated supply chain is better off if a retailer utilizes trade credit financing provided by supplier without additional free cash instead of loans from banks under the scenario of centralized decision-making in supply chain. In decentralized decision-making supply chain, the supplier may set trade credit and buyback contract to share inventory financing costs and the risks of uncertainty inventory demand, which may make the retailer order the same optimal purchases as integrated supply chain under joint decisions. Furthermore, the supplier can also adjust sharing ratio of joint profits in the supply chain by changing the wholesale price. Finally, some numerical examples are used to illustrate the results obtained in this paper and some management enlightenments are proposed.

Key words: trade credit, operations investment, buyback contracts, bankruptcy risk, supply chain coordination