›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (6): 192-204.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

地理位置、环境规制空间异质性与环境信息选择性披露

姚圣, 杨洁, 梁昊天   

  1. 中国矿业大学管理学院, 徐州 221116
  • 收稿日期:2014-05-04 出版日期:2016-06-28 发布日期:2016-07-07
  • 作者简介:姚圣,中国矿业大学管理学院教授,硕士生导师,博士;杨洁,中国矿业大学管理学院硕士研究生;梁昊天,中国矿业大学管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71572189;71102163);中国博士后特别资助基金项目(2012T50529);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2011M500977)。

Firm Location, Spatial Heterogeneity of Environmental Regulation and Selective Disclosure of Environmental Information

Yao Sheng, Yang Jie, Liang Haotian   

  1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116
  • Received:2014-05-04 Online:2016-06-28 Published:2016-07-07

摘要:

本文基于中央政府到地方政府、地方政府到企业双重博弈的角度分析了企业环境信息选择性披露的影响因素,并使用经验数据验证了地理位置、环境规制空间异质性对企业环境信息选择性披露的具体影响。研究结果表明,总体情况而言,地理位置与环境信息选择性披露显著负相关,即企业距离政府监管者越远,环境信息总体披露较少,披露的显著性、数量性与时间性越弱。对非国有控股上市公司而言,这种负向影响关系更加明显,但对国有控股上市公司来讲则不存在显著的负向影响关系。另外,环境规制空间异质性对企业环境信息披露总体、显著性与数量性均具有显著负向影响关系,但对环境信息时间性方面则不存在显著性影响关系。进一步研究发现,国有控股上市公司具有与总体样本一致的结果,但对非国有控股企业而言,环境规制空间异质性对企业环境信息披露总体、显著性、数量性与时间性上不具有显著性影响。已有文献由于未考虑到环境披露政策在执行过程中的主体博弈影响因素,因此并未取得一致的研究结论。本文研究结论表明,决定博弈结果的地理与制度性因素是影响企业环境信息披露内容与程度的主要因素。

关键词: 地理位置, 空间异质性, 环境信息披露, 选择性披露, 行政隶属

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the factors that influence the selective disclosure of environmental information based on double game from the center government to the local government and from the local government to the firm, and studies the influence on the selective disclosure of environmental information made by the firm location, spatial heterogeneity of environmental regulation. Results show that there is a negative link between the firm location and the selective disclosure of environmental information. In other words, the distance between the firm and the regulator is longer, and the total environmental information is disclosed less. The same result is for its significance, amount and time. Especially the negative link is obvious to the non-state-owned companies, but it is not significant to the state-owned companies. Moreover, the spatial heterogeneity of environmental regulation has the negative relation with the total environmental information, its significance and amount. But its time is the exception. Further studies show that the state-owned companies have the same results with the overall samples. However, the non-state-owned companies have no the significant relation for the spatial heterogeneity of environmental regulation. Current literatures can't reach the agreement because of ignoring the influence of the different bodies' game in process of the environmental information regulation policy being implemented. Our results show that, the geography and institutional features that determine the game results in China are the main factors that determine the content and degree of the environmental information disclosure.

Key words: firm location, spatial heterogeneity, environmental information disclosure, selective disclosure, administrative relation