管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (6): 150-161.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

创业家族的共同治理有效还是无效?——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究

贺小刚1,2, 李婧3, 张远飞4, 连燕玲5   

  1. 1. 上海财经大学国际工商管理学院, 上海 200433;
    2. 上海财经大学浙江学院, 金华 321019;
    3. 上海政法学院经济管理学院, 上海 201701;
    4. 汇添富基金管理股份有限公司, 上海 200120;
    5. 华东师范大学商学院, 上海 200241
  • 收稿日期:2014-02-11 出版日期:2016-06-28 发布日期:2016-07-07
  • 作者简介:贺小刚,上海财经大学国际工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士,上海财经大学浙江学院工商管理系主任;李婧,上海政法学院经济管理学院副教授,博士;张远飞,汇添富基金管理股份有限公司助理研究员,博士;连燕玲,华东师范大学商学院副教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71172140;71372037);教育部人文社会科学项目(12YJ630093);上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(15ZS083);上海财经大学创新团队支持计划(SHUFE0618);上海政法学院青年科研基金项目(2015XQN10)。

Is Common Control Effective in Entrepreneurial Family Firms?——An Analysis Based on Chinese Publicly Held Family Firms

He Xiaogang1,2, Li Jing3, Zhang Yuanfei4, Lian Yanling5   

  1. 1. School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433;
    2. School of Zhejiang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Jinhua 321019;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201701;
    4. China Universal Asset Management Co., Ltd, Shanghai 200120;
    5. School of Business, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241
  • Received:2014-02-11 Online:2016-06-28 Published:2016-07-07

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摘要：

本文针对那种假定家族成员都是纯粹的、目光短浅的利他主义者,提出了一个家族成员为有限利他主义者的假设。我们的主要观点是,创始人及其家族成员的共同治理是有效的,主要原因在于家族成员是兼顾情感财富与物质财富的积累的有限利他主义者。本文基于中国上市公司的数据所进行的经验研究结果表明,我国创业家族企业大多采取家族共同治理的模式,而不是创业者独自控制股权和(或)管理权的模式;相对于创始人独自控制股权的治理模式,创业家族共同控制股权更为有效;相对于创始人独自控制股权和管理权的治理模式以及创始人控制股权而职业经理人控制管理权的治理模式,创业家族共同控制股权与管理权更为有效。本文的研究表明那些自我雇佣的家族成员并不会简单地采取纯粹利他主义行为,而是有限利他的相对理性行为。

关键词: 创业家族, 共同治理, 纯粹利他主义, 有限利他主义, 治理效率

Abstract:

This paper assumes that family members are not purely altruistic and short-sighted, but altruistic only to a certain extent. The main point is that common control by the founder and his family members is effective, because family members are bounded altruists who concern both emotional and material wealth. Based on the data of Chinese public listed companies, our empirical results show that, first, common control is the most widely used control mechanism in Chinese entrepreneurial family firms; second, firms that share ownership among family members are more effective than those owned by the founder alone; third, concerning about ownership and managerial rights together, the sharing of these rights among family members is also more effective than the holding of both the managerial and ownership right by the founder alone or the holding of the ownership right by the founder alone and holding of the managerial right by professional managers. Our results demonstrate that the self-employed family members do not act as pure altruists, but bounded altruists.

Key words: entrepreneurial families, common control, pure altruism, bounded altruism, governance efficiency