管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (10): 298-309.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

容忍vs.打压：供应链减排不合规的碳审计机制研究

伏红勇1,2, 雷一峰1,2, 掌曙光3, 李雨洁1,2   

  1. 1. 西南政法大学商学院, 重庆 401120;
    2. 西南政法大学供应链合规管理研究中心, 重庆 401120;
    3. 新加坡国立大学重庆研究院, 重庆 401123
  • 收稿日期:2022-01-04 出版日期:2023-10-28 发布日期:2023-11-27
  • 通讯作者: 雷一峰（通讯作者），西南政法大学商学院硕士研究生。
  • 作者简介:伏红勇，西南政法大学商学院教授，博士生导师，博士；掌曙光，新加坡国立大学重庆研究院副研究员，博士；李雨洁，西南政法大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（7210020637）；教育部人文社会科学规划项目（22XJA630001）；重庆市自然科学基金博士后科学基金项目（cstc2019jcyj-bshX0080）；重庆市研究生科研创新项目（CYS21209）。

Tolerance vs. Suppression: Research on Carbon Audit Mechanism for Supply Chain’s Noncompliance with Emission Reduction Standards

Fu Hongyong1,2, Lei Yifeng1,2, Zhang Shuguang3, Li Yujie1,2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120;
    2. Research Center of Supply Chain Compliance Management, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120;
    3. National University of Singapore(Chongqing) Research Institute, Chongqing 401123
  • Received:2022-01-04 Online:2023-10-28 Published:2023-11-27

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摘要： “3060”双碳目标对我国低碳发展提出了全新要求，随着碳配额总量上限的逐步下调，客观上增加了排放主体减排合规的不确定性。为此，借鉴惠普与华为激励供应商减排合规的理念，基于能够识别碳减排不合规的工具——碳审计，本文设计了基于容忍的碳审计机制与基于打压的碳审计机制，并进一步探究了利己策略与共赢策略对这两种碳审计机制的影响。研究发现，两种策略下最优的碳审计机制依赖于买方的商誉损失系数与采购价格。具体而言，利己策略下，当损失系数较低时或当损失系数适中且采购价格较低时，基于容忍的碳审计机制占优；当损失系数适中且采购价格较高时或当损失系数较高时，基于打压的碳审计机制占优。共赢策略下，当损失系数较低或者适中时，若采购价格满足一定的条件，基于容忍的碳审计机制占优。此外，研究还发现，相较于共赢策略，利己策略下占优的碳审计机制更能促使供应商碳减排合规。

关键词: 低碳供应链, 碳减排, 合规管理, 碳审计, 机制研究

Abstract: The “3060” dual carbon goals set a new requirement for low-carbon development. The lowering cap of total carbon quota objectively confronts carbon-emitting enterprises with uncertainty in terms of their compliance with emission reduction standards. To this end, we draw on the practices of HP and Huawei incentivizing the supplier emission reduction compliance, and use carbon audit, a tool that can identify carbon emission reduction noncompliance, to design tolerance-based carbon audit mechanism and suppression-based carbon audit mechanism and further explore the impact of self-interest strategy and win-win strategy on the two carbon audit mechanisms. The results show that the optimal carbon audit mechanism under the two strategies depends on the buyer’s goodwill loss coefficient and sourcing price. Specifically, under the self-interested strategy, when the loss coefficient is low, or when the loss coefficient is moderate and sourcing price is low, the tolerance-based carbon audit mechanism is the dominant mechanism; when the loss coefficient is moderate and sourcing price is high, or when the loss coefficient is high, suppression-based carbon audit mechanism is the dominant mechanism. Under the win-win strategy, when the loss coefficient is low or moderate, the tolerance-based carbon audit mechanism is dominant if the sourcing price meets certain conditions. In addition, we also find that compared with the win-win strategy, the dominant mechanism under the self-interested strategy is more helpful to supplier carbon emission reduction compliance.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, carbon emission reduction, compliance management, carbon audit, mechanism research