管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (10): 283-297.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

竞争环境下考虑平台差异度的供应链决策研究

李旭阁, 邱若臻, 孙月   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110169
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-12 出版日期:2023-10-28 发布日期:2023-11-27
  • 通讯作者: 邱若臻(通讯作者),东北大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:李旭阁,东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生;孙月,东北大学工商管理学院博士后,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72272030;72302039);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22YJA630064;22YJC630123);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(N2306007)。

A Supply Chain Decision Research that Factors in the Platform Differentiation in Competitive Environment

Li Xuge, Qiu Ruozhen, Sun Yue   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169
  • Received:2022-08-12 Online:2023-10-28 Published:2023-11-27

摘要: 针对由一个供应商和两个竞争性零售平台组成的供应链,研究了竞争环境下考虑平台差异度的供应商定价和零售平台收益分成决策问题。在消费者购买行为分析基础上,讨论了供应商高、中和低三种定价策略下的需求函数,构建了以竞争性零售平台为主方、供应商为从方的Nash-Stackelberg博弈模型,给出了供应商三种定价策略下平台和供应商的均衡决策,分析了平台差异度对供应链均衡决策和成员利润的影响。最后,通过数值算例验证了文中结果,并给出了相应的管理启示和决策建议。研究表明:(1)供应商的定价策略和平台之间的差异度显著影响供应链成员双方的决策和利润,因此供应商和平台应根据不同的定价策略和平台差异度来制定定价决策和收益分成决策;(2)在不同的定价策略下平台差异度的增加会损害供应商的利润,但可能会使竞争性零售平台获益,因此平台方更有动机为消费者提供特色化购物体验以增加平台差异度;(3)尽管平台和供应商分别在不同的定价策略下获得最高利润,但仍可通过设计额外的机制(例如,纳什讨价还价)来确保交易的达成。该研究为供应商和竞争性零售平台在考虑平台差异度时如何进行产品定价和制定收益分成率提供了决策建议。

关键词: 平台竞争, 平台差异度, 定价, 收益分成率, 博弈论

Abstract: Assuming a supply chain consists of one supplier and two competing retail platforms, this paper investigates supplier pricing and retail platform revenue sharing decision in a competitive environment considering the degree of platform differentiation. Based on the analysis of consumer purchase behavior, this paper discusses the demand function under three pricing strategies (high pricing strategy, medium pricing strategy, and low pricing strategy) of the supplier, and constructs a Nash-Stackelberg game model with the competitive retail platforms as the leader and the supplier as the follower. The equilibrium decisions under three pricing strategies of the supplier are given, and the influence of the degree of differentiation between the platforms on equilibrium decisions and profits for the supply chain members is analyzed. At last, this paper validates the results by numerical examples, and gives the corresponding managerial insights and decision-making suggestions. The results show that: (1) the supplier and the two platforms should make different pricing decisions and revenue sharing decisions based on different pricing strategies and platform differences; (2) an increase in platform differentiation under different pricing strategies will harm the profit of suppliers, but may benefit competitive retail platforms; the platform has a stronger motivation to provide consumers with a characteristic shopping experience to increase the platform differentiation; (3) although the supplier and the two platforms get the highest profits under different pricing strategies, additional mechanisms (Nash bargaining) can be designed to ensure the transaction. This study provides decision-making recommendations for the supplier and competitive retail platforms on how to price products and set revenue sharing rates when consumers consider the degree of differentiation between the platforms.

Key words: platform competition, platform differentiation, pricing, revenue sharing rate, game theory