非国有股东治理能促进国有企业绿色技术创新吗？——基于混合所有制改革的实证研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 绿色技术创新是协调经济增长与环境保护的关键力量。公司治理机制的完善对于提升企业绿色技术创新能力至关重要，而混合所有制改革通过引入非国有股东对公司治理机制产生了深远影响。本文手工搜集并整理了2008—2019年国有上市企业非国有股东持股比例和委派高管数据，从股权结构和高层治理两个层面衡量混合所有制改革背景下非国有股东参与治理的程度，实证研究非国有股东治理对国有企业绿色技术创新的影响及作用机制，并从企业类型和环境规制压力两个方面进行了异质性分析。结果显示：第一，非国有股东治理促进了企业绿色技术创新。异质性股东对绿色技术创新的影响存在显著的差异，民营股东可以发挥有效的治理效应，显著提升绿色技术创新水平。第二，非国有股东治理的促进作用通过融资约束、代理成本和风险承担水平三种路径实现。第三，对于不同类型和环境规制压力不同的国有企业而言，非国有股东治理的影响存在异质性。如果国有企业属于商业一类国有企业或面临较高环境规制压力，非国有股东治理对绿色技术创新具有显著的正向效应。本文研究发现不仅有利于深化和拓展混合所有制改革效应和绿色技术创新驱动因素的理论研究，而且为深化混合所有制改革和推动国有企业绿色转型提供了实践启示。

关键词: 非国有股东治理, 混合所有制改革, 绿色技术创新, 股权结构, 高层治理

Abstract: Green technological innovation is a key driving force for coordinating economic growth and environmental protection. The improvement of the corporate governance mechanism is crucial to enhancing the green technology innovation capability of enterprises, and the mixed-ownership reform has a profound impact on the corporate governance mechanism by introducing non-state-owned shareholders. This paper manually collects and sorts out data on the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders and the ratio of directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2019, measures the degree of participation of non-state-owned shareholders in governance from the perspectives of ownership structure and board governance and empirically studies the impact of the governance of non-state-owned shareholders on enterprise green technological innovation and the underlying mechanism. Also, a heterogeneity analysis is carried out from two perspective:enterprise type and environmental regulation pressure. The results show that:Firstly, the governance of non-state-owned shareholders has promoted green technological innovation of enterprises. There are significant differences in the impact of heterogeneous shareholders. Private shareholders can exert effective governance effects and significantly improve the level of green technological innovation. Secondly, the promotional effect of the governance of non-state-owned shareholders is achieved through three paths:easing financing constraints, reducing agency costs, and raising risk-taking levels. Thirdly, for enterprises of various types or with different environmental regulation pressure, the influence of the governance of non-state-owned shareholders is heterogeneous. If state-owned enterprises are commercial enterprises or face high environmental regulation pressure, the governance of non-state-owned shareholders has a significant positive impact on green technological innovation. The findings of this paper are not only conducive to deepening theoretical research on the effects of mixed-ownership reform and driving factors of green technological innovation, but also provide practical enlightenment for deepening mixed-ownership reform and promoting the green transformation of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: the governance of non-state-owned shareholders, mixed-ownership reform, green technological innovation, ownership structure, board governance

徐丹丹, 李向亮, 王婕. 非国有股东治理能促进国有企业绿色技术创新吗？——基于混合所有制改革的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(9): 102-115.

Xu Dandan, Li Xiangliang, Wang Jie. Can the Governance of Non-state-owned Shareholders Promote the Green Technological Innovation of State-owned Enterprises?——Empirical Research Based on Mixed-Ownership Reform[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(9): 102-115.

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