管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 57-70.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

非国有股东参与治理能提升国企并购绩效吗？

马勇1, 王满2, 马影2   

  1. 1. 南京审计大学会计学院, 南京 211815;
    2. 东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心, 大连 116025
  • 收稿日期:2019-11-12 出版日期:2022-07-28 发布日期:2022-08-19
  • 通讯作者: 马勇（通讯作者），南京审计大学会计学院讲师，博士。
  • 作者简介:王满，东北财经大学会计学院／中国内部控制研究中心教授，博士生导师，博士;马影，东北财经大学会计学院／中国内部控制研究中心博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目（19BGL066）；黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目（19GLE322）。

Can Non-state-owned Shareholders Improve the State-owned Enterprises' M&A Performance by Participating in Corporate Governance?

Ma Yong1, Wang Man2, Ma Ying2   

  1. 1. School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815;
    2. School of Accounting/China Internal Control Research Center, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025
  • Received:2019-11-12 Online:2022-07-28 Published:2022-08-19

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摘要： 本文以2007—2016年国有上市公司发生的并购事件为研究对象，分析和检验了非国有股东参与治理对国有企业并购绩效的影响。研究发现：第一，非国有股东参与治理的程度越高，国有企业并购绩效水平越高；第二，非国有股东积极参与股东大会投票，有利于其充分发挥制衡、监督作用，提升并购绩效水平；第三，在未向国有企业委派董事的情况下，非国有股东依然能够以股权制衡方式影响企业并购绩效，但作用效果有所减弱；第四，减少非效率的并购交易、改善并购后的资源整合质量是非国有股东提升并购绩效的重要途径；第五，不同性质的非国有股东治理效果存在差异，相比外资和民营股东而言，机构投资者的治理效应总体更强。以上结论表明，非国有股东参与治理有利于国有企业并购绩效的改善。在混合所有制改革过程中可进一步降低非国有股东进入国有企业的门槛，同时保障其相应权利（如投票权和董事委派权等），使不同性质的资本都能参与到内部治理活动中，共同促进国有企业经营效率的提升。

关键词: 并购绩效, 非国有股东, 股权制衡, 委派董事, 混合所有制改革

Abstract: Based on the M&A events of state-owned listed companies in 2007-2016, this paper analyzes and tests the impact of nonstate-owned shareholders' governance effect on the state-owned enterprises'(SOEs') M&A performance. The results show that:firstly, the deeper the non-state-owned shareholders participate in governance, the better the SOEs' M&A performs; secondly, active participation in voting is beneficial for shareholders to give full play to the role of check and balance, and improve the level of M&A performance; thirdly, if no director is appointed to a SOE, the check and balance effect of non-state-owned shareholders becomes less effective; fourthly, reducing inefficient M&A transactions and improving the quality of integration after M&A are important channels through which nonstate-owned shareholders act on SOEs' M&A performance; fifthly, compared with foreign investors and private investors, institutional investors play a bigger role of governance. The above conclusions show that the introduction of non-state-owned capital is conducive to the improvement of SOEs' M&A performance. In the process of mixed ownership reform, the threshold for non-state-owned shareholders to enter the SOEs could be further reduced, and their corresponding rights (such as the right to vote and the right to appoint directors) should be guaranteed, so that different types of capital can participate in the internal governance activities equally, and improve the operating efficiency of SOEs jointly.

Key words: M&A performance, non-state-owned shareholders, checks and balance, director appointment, mixed ownership reform