管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 41-51.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业影子银行融资能够发挥债务治理效应吗？——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

李世辉1, 邓来1, 雷新途2   

  1. 1. 中南大学商学院, 长沙 410083;
    2. 浙江工业大学管理学院, 杭州 310032
  • 收稿日期:2021-03-08 出版日期:2021-12-28 发布日期:2022-01-25
  • 作者简介:李世辉,中南大学商学院教授,硕士生导师,博士;邓来,中南大学商学院硕士研究生;雷新途,浙江工业大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士
  • 基金资助:
    湖南省自然科学基金面上项目（2021JJ30882）；国家自然科学基金面上项目（71872185）

Does Corporate Financing from Shadow Banking Exert Debt Governance Effect?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

Li Shihui1, Deng Lai1, Lei Xintu2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083;
    2. School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310032
  • Received:2021-03-08 Online:2021-12-28 Published:2022-01-25

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摘要： 过往鲜有文献在微观层面识别企业从影子银行融入资金的规模，因而更多从宏观层面研究影子银行融资的治理效应。本文以2013—2019年A股上市公司为研究样本，采用杠杆操纵的程度来识别并衡量微观企业影子银行融资规模，研究发现影子银行融资拥有一般银行信贷无法获取的隐性信息而具备融资合约特殊实施机制，因而更能节约融资企业的代理成本。影子银行融资在“去杠杆”的大背景下客观上缓解企业融资约束，且期限较短、利率高，促使企业选择高质量的投资项目，因此有效抑制了企业非效率投资。拓展研究发现市场化程度越低，融资约束越小，公司治理水平越高，影子银行融资上述治理效应越显著。本文丰富相关研究的同时，能够为影子银行相关政策的制定与实施提供重要借鉴。

关键词: 企业影子银行融资, 债务治理效应, 代理成本, 非效率投资

Abstract: Little literature has identified the scale of corporates financing from shadow banking from the micro perspective in the past. Instead, many researches explore the governance effect of financing from the shadow banking from the macro level. This paper takes 2013-2019 A-share listed companies as research samples. We use leverage manipulation level to measure corporates' financing scale from shadow banking. The result shows that financing from shadow banking has private information that general banks cannot obtain and has a unique implementation mechanism of the financing contract. Thus, it helps to save the agency costs of financing enterprises. Under the background of "de-leveraging", financing from shadow banking objectively eases corporates' financial constraints. This short-term and high-interest financing channel also prompts enterprises to choose high-quality investment projects. In turn, it effectively restrains the inefficient investment of enterprises. Further study finds that the governance effect of financing from shadow banking is more prominent with a lower marketization degree, a lower financial constraints and a more significant level of corporate governance. This paper enriches relevant researches and provides essential references for the formulation and implementation of shadow banking policies.

Key words: corporate financing from shadow banking, debt governance effect, agency cost, inefficient investment