管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 128-138.

• 电子商务与信息管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

强监管下P2P网贷平台能否提供纯信息中介服务？——基于演化博弈模型及仿真分析

何珏1, 梅国平1, 季凯文2   

  1. 1. 江西师范大学管理科学与工程研究中心, 南昌 330022;
    2. 江西师范大学江西发展研究院, 南昌 330022
  • 收稿日期:2020-02-29 出版日期:2021-08-28 发布日期:2021-09-04
  • 通讯作者: 梅国平(通讯作者),江西师范大学管理科学与工程研究中心教授,博士生导师,博士
  • 作者简介:何珏,江西师范大学管理科学与工程研究中心博士研究生;季凯文,江西师范大学江西发展研究院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学重大基金项目（20&ZD068）；江西省社会科学青年基金项目（20YJ34）；江西省研究生创新基金资助项目（YC2020-B074）。

Can P2P Online Loan Platforms Play the Role of Pure Information “Intermediary”?——Based on Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation Analysis

He Jue1, Mei Guoping1, Ji Kaiwen2   

  1. 1. Management Science and Engineering Research Center, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang 330022;
    2. Jiangxi Development Research Institute, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang 330022
  • Received:2020-02-29 Online:2021-08-28 Published:2021-09-04

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摘要： P2P网贷平台的野蛮生长，导致我国网贷行业风险密集暴露。以P2P网贷平台能否提供纯信息中介服务为出发点，构建P2P网贷平台与金融监管机构之间的演化博弈模型，研究两主体在博弈过程中的策略选择，并用Matlab软件仿真模拟不同情形下的演化稳定策略均衡点。研究发现，当网贷平台提供纯信息中介服务获得的激励小于提供非纯信息中介服务获得的其他净收益，且金融监管部门强监管下监管收益大于监管成本时，P2P网络借贷平台能提供纯信息中介服务，且二者演化稳定均衡点达到“理想”状态。研究还发现，当提高网贷平台的“寻租”成本、加大对网贷平台提供非纯信息中介服务的惩罚力度以及提高金融监管部门的监管收益，能有效使系统分别从“最劣”“无效”“不良”状态向“理想”状态不断演化，实现P2P网贷平台和金融监管部门的双重帕累托改进。

关键词: P2P网贷平台, 纯信息中介, 演化博弈, Matlab仿真

Abstract: The brutal growth of P2P online loan platforms has led to intensive exposure of risks in China's online loan industry. Taking the P2P online loan platform as a pure information intermediary service as a starting point, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the P2P online loan platform and financial regulatory agencies, study the strategic choices of the two players in the game process, and use Matlab software to simulate different situations the equilibrium point of the evolutionary stability strategy. The study finds that when the incentives provided by online loan platforms for providing pure information intermediary services are less than the other net benefits obtained by providing non-pure information intermediary services, and the regulatory benefits under the strong supervision of financial regulatory authorities are greater than the regulatory costs, P2P online lending platforms can provide pure information intermediary services, and the equilibrium point between the evolution of the two reaches an "ideal" state. The study also finds that increasing the "rent-seeking" costs of online loan platforms, increasing the penalties for providing non-pure information intermediary services on online loan platforms, and increasing the regulatory revenues of financial regulatory authorities can effectively make the system away from the "worst", "invalid" and "bad" states and graudally toward the "ideal" state, realizing a double Pareto improvement of P2P online loan platforms and financial regulatory authorities.

Key words: P2P online loan platform, pure information intermediary, evolutionary game, Matlab simulation