“效率契约”还是“管理权力”？——公司治理对CEO股权激励的影响研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 效率契约理论和管理权力理论都探讨了公司治理与高管股权激励之间的关系，但结论并不一致。为了验证何种理论更为契合，本文借鉴并拓展以往学者的研究，实证检验了公司治理对CEO股权激励的影响。研究发现：（1）公司治理与CEO股权激励之间存在替代效应，即股权薪酬是公司治理工具，而有效公司治理可替代股权薪酬的激励作用；（2）影响CEO股权激励效用因素有三类：公司治理强度、经济性因素（如公司盈利情况等）和其他因素（如CEO个人特征等）；（3）公司治理强度与经济性因素之间并不存在负相关，而与其引致的股权激励水平之间呈负相关；（4）管理权力理论更适用于解释公司治理强度与CEO股权激励之间的关系特征。由于组织激励管理目标和CEO股权收益目标一致，公司治理与CEO股权激励之间存在替代关系，组织会根据公司治理水平来调整股权激励计划，即调整CEO薪酬结构中股权薪酬比例。

关键词: 效率契约, 管理权力, 公司治理, CEO股权激励

Abstract: Efficiency Contract Theory and Management Power Theory both discuss the relationship between corporate governance and executive equity incentive, but their conclusions are not consistent. In order to verify which theory is more suitable, the paper uses and expands the existing researches to empirically test the impact of corporate governance on CEO equity incentive. The results show that:1) there is an alternative effect between corporate governance and CEO equity incentive, as equity compensation is a corporate governance tool and effective corporate governance can replace the incentive effect of equity compensation; 2) There are three types factors that influence the CEO equity incentive effectiveness:corporate governance intensity, economic factors (such as corporate profitability) and other factors (such as CEO personal characteristics); 3) Strongth of corporate governance is not negatively correlated with economic factors, but there is a negative correlation between degree and equity incentive level. 4) Management power theory is more suitable to explain the relationship between corporate governance intensity and CEO equity incentive. Because the goal of organizational incentive management is consistent with that of CEO's equity return, there is an alternative relationship between corporate governance and CEO's equity incentive. The organization will adjust the equity incentive plan according to the level of corporate governance, such as adjusting the proportion of equity compensation in CEO's compensation structure.

Key words: efficiency contract, management power, corporate governance, CEO equity incentive

于震, 张行. “效率契约”还是“管理权力”？——公司治理对CEO股权激励的影响研究[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(10): 259-275.

Yu Zhen, Zhang Xing. “Efficiency Contract” or “Management Power”? —— Research on the Influence of Corporate Governance on CEO's Equity Incentive[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(10): 259-275.

参考文献

[1] 郝永亮,金昕,张永冀. "减持迷雾"下的员工持股计划——基于股权激励的对比分析[J]. 管理评论, 2019,31(10):164-177
[2] 陈霞,马连福,丁振松. 国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2017,29(3):147-156
[3] Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):737-783
[4] Core J., Guay W., Larcker D. Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives:A Survey[J]. Economic Policy Review, 2003,9(1):191-212
[5] Biggs J., Fumetti S., Kelly-Quinn M. The Importance of Small Waterbodies for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services:Implications for Policy Makers[J]. Hydrobiologia, 2017,793(1):3-39
[6] Gillan S. Has Pay for Performance Gone Awry? Views from a Corporate Governance Forum[J]. Research Dialogue, 2005,(68):1011-1023
[7] Guay W., Kothari S., Sloan R. Accounting for Employee Stock Options[J]. American Economic Review, 2003,93(2):405-409
[8] Coombes A. Excess Compensation:Institutional Investors Say U.S. Execs Are Overpaid[J]. Market Watch, 2005,12(1):235-252
[9] Lambert R., Larcker D., Verrecchia R. Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1991,29(1):129-149
[10] Meulbroek L. The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options[J]. Financial Management, 2001,30(2):5-44
[11] Ingersoll J. The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options[J]. Journal of Business, 2006,79(2):453-487
[12] Himmelberg C., Hubbard R., Palia D. Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and The Link Between Ownership and Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,53(3):353-384
[13] Core J., Guay W. The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999,28(2):151-184
[14] Murphy K. Executive Compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics[R]. North-Holland, Amsterdam,1999
[15] Bebchuk L., Fried J. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003,17(3):71-92
[16] Gompers P., Ishii J., Metrick A. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118(1):107-155
[17] Fama E., French K. Industry Cost of Equity[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,43(2):153-193
[18] Bartov E., Mohanram P. Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, and Executive Stock-Option Exercises[J]. Accounting Review, 2004,79(4):889-920
[19] Sundaramurthy C., Mahoney J. M., Mahoney J. T. Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1997,18(3):231-245
[20] Gillan S., Hartzell J., Starks L. Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance:Evidence from Board Structures and Charter Provisions[R]. Working Paper, Texas Tech University and University of Texas at Austin, 2006
[21] David Y. Good Timing:CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements[J]. Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):449-476
[22] Aboody D., Kasznik R. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000,29(1):73-100
[23] Lie E. On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards[J]. Management Science, 2005,51(5):802-812
[24] Choudhary P., Rajgopal S., Venkatachalam M. Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2009,47(1):105-146
[25] Song W. L., Wan K. M. Does CEO Compensation Reflect Managerial Ability or Managerial Power? Evidence from the Compensation of Powerful CEOs[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2019,56(6):1-14
[26] Abernethy M. A., Kuang Y. F., Qin B. The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design[J]. The Accounting Review, 2015,90(7):1265-1306
[27] Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360
[28] Albuquerque R., Miao J. CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance[J]. Annals of Economics and Finance, 2013,11(1):21-56
[29] Guo S., Kang Q., Mitnik O. A. Managerial Power and CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2014,30(1):70-94
[30] 吕新军. 股权结构、高管激励与上市公司治理效率——基于异质性随机边界模型的研究[J]. 管理评论, 2015,27(6):128-139