›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 249-261.

• 投入占用产出技术及其应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

非对称信息下可再生能源并网机制设计

孔令丞, 涂改革, 张英辉   

  1. 华东理工大学商学院, 上海 200237
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-14 出版日期:2018-05-28 发布日期:2018-05-29
  • 作者简介:孔令丞,华东理工大学商学院教授,博士生导师,博士,能源经济与环境管理研究所副所长;涂改革,华东理工大学商学院硕士研究生;张英辉,华东理工大学商学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金重大课题(15ZDB161);国家自科基金面上项目(71273091)。

Design of Grid-connected Renewable Energy Mechanism under Asymmetric Information

Kong Lingcheng, Tu Gaige, Zhang Yinghui   

  1. East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 200237
  • Received:2016-03-14 Online:2018-05-28 Published:2018-05-29

摘要:

可再生能源并网实践中,不仅存在其发电产出与电力需求随机性的问题,而且并网补贴政策还受到电网成本信息非透明的影响。本文借助收益共享合约理论,通过将分享系数构造成电网边际成本的函数,调整发电方与电网的部分转移支付,建立非对称信息情景下的收益共享合约。进而基于电网成本显示激励机制理论,对可再生能源电力产出与需求的随机性及电网边际成本进行参数变动性分析,得到合约协调的供应链均衡。

关键词: 可再生能源并网, 随机性, 补贴政策, 收益共享合约, 显示激励机制

Abstract:

In the practice of renewable energy grid-connection, there is not only the problem of randomness in power generation output and electricity demand, but also the effect of information opacity of power grid cost on the subsidy policy. Based on the theory of revenue-sharing contract, this paper establishes a revenue-sharing contract under the scenario of asymmetric information by constructing the sha-ring coefficient as a function of the marginal cost of the grid and adjusting the partial transfer payment between the generator and the grid. A parameter variability analysis is then carried out regarding the randomness of power generation output and electricity demand as well as the marginal cost of the grid based on the theory of revealed incentive mechanism of power grid cost. Therefore, the supply chain equilib-rium through contract coordination is obtained.

Key words: renewable energy grid-connection, randomness, subsidy policy, revenue-sharing contract, revealed incentive mechanism