管理评论

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 239-248.

• 投入占用产出技术及其应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业治污投入与排污权交易政策动态一致性的博弈机制研究

张艳楠1, 孙绍荣2   

  1. 1. 上海师范大学旅游学院, 上海 200234;
    2. 上海理工大学管理学院, 上海 200093
  • 收稿日期:2015-06-08 出版日期:2018-05-28 发布日期:2018-05-29
  • 作者简介:张艳楠,上海师范大学旅游学院讲师,博士;孙绍荣,上海理工大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金面上项目（71771151）。

Game Mechanism Research Based on Enterprise Input of Pollution Control and Dynamic Consistency of Emissions Trading Policy

Zhang Yannan1, Sun Shaorong2   

  1. 1. School of Tourism, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234;
    2. School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093
  • Received:2015-06-08 Online:2018-05-28 Published:2018-05-29

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摘要：

本文基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究排污权交易市场背景下,博弈双方企业产量的确定、政府部门规定单位产量治污水平的决策问题。引入政府部门查处或社会公众举报非法排污的概率,构建一种以控制排污总量为标准的治理模型。分析不同行动顺序下的最优反应函数,以及政策的动态一致性,重新定位企业的经济效益、政府部门的社会效益和环境效益,全面权衡治污设备技术费用投入与社会环境效益。研究表明,政府部门具有信用可以提高企业的治污水平;当政府部门制定政策具有非平均主义倾向时,其政策具有动态一致性;且企业投入的治污设备技术费用是排污权交易价格、单位超标排污罚金、政府部门查处或社会公众举报企业非法排污行为概率的递减函数。该结果可作为政府部门制定相关政策的参考。

关键词: 排污权, Stackelberg博弈, 治污投入, 政策动态一致性, 环境损益

Abstract:

In the paper, output of enterprises and pollution control level set by government are mainly analyzed based on Stackelberg game model under the background of emission trading market. And a governance model on the basis of controlling total emission can be constructed through the probability of illegal emission behavior punished by government and/or reported by the public. Moreover, this pa-per relocates economic benefit of enterprises and social environmental benefit of government and then comprehensively weighs the rela-tionship between pollution control input and environmental benefit. At last, results are illustrated. Firstly, credit of the government can improve the pollution control level of enterprises. Secondly, when government set a policy without tendency towards the average, the poli-cy has dynamic consistency. Thirdly, pollution control input decreases when price of emission trading, penalty or illegal emission or probability of government punishment or public reporting rise. All of the results can be regarded as a reference for the government to make policies.

Key words: emission right, Stackelberg game, pollution control input, policy dynamic consistency, environment profit and loss