管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (7): 252-262.

• 运营与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

基于“物联网+区块链”的农产品供应链定价博弈与利润分配

郑代涛1, 胡祥培2, 吉清凯1   

  1. 1. 海南大学国际商学院, 海口 570228;
    2. 大连理工大学经济与管理学院, 大连 116024
  • 收稿日期:2024-09-18 发布日期:2026-07-29
  • 作者简介:郑代涛,海南大学国际商学院硕士研究生;胡祥培,大连理工大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;吉清凯(通讯作者),海南大学国际商学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    海南省哲学社会科学规划课题(HNSK(QN)22-26);国家自然科学基金项目(72461009;72061009);国家自然科学基金国际重点合作项目(72010107002);海南省自然科学基金项目(723MS028)。

Pricing and Profit Allocation of Agricultural Supply Chain Based on IoT and Blockchain Technology

Zheng Daitao1, Hu Xiangpei2, Ji Qingkai1   

  1. 1. International Business School, Hainan University, Haikou 570228;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024
  • Received:2024-09-18 Published:2026-07-29

摘要: 考虑一条二级农产品供应链,其中农场和零售商拟采用“物联网+区块链”以应对产出不确定和消费者对农产品安全的担忧。通过构建Stackelberg模型,刻画零售商的定价与农场的产量博弈均衡,分析“物联网+区块链”的影响及供应链成员的采用意愿。研究发现,采用“物联网+区块链”后的销售价格增量等于“物联网+区块链”缓解消费者担忧上的效益和单位变动成本的平均值。只有在“物联网+区块链”的净效益(缓解消费者担忧上的效益和单位变动成本之差)较高时,需求(或计划产量)才会增加。总体而言,农场比零售商更愿意采用“物联网+区块链”,但当农产品质量较高时,零售商更愿意采用。通过基于收益共享的Nash谈判,双方同时采用的可能性增加,并能实现帕累托改进。数值实验验证了理论结果。

关键词: 农产品供应链, 物联网, 区块链, 产出不确定, Nash谈判

Abstract: We consider a two-tier agricultural supply chain where a farm and a retailer propose to adopt Internet of Things and blockchain technology (IoT+BCT) to deal with yield uncertainty and consumers’ safety concern about the agri-product. By constructing a Stackelberg model, the equilibrium of the pricing and production decisions between the retailer and the farm is analyzed, along with the impact of IoT+ BCT and the adoption willingness of supply chain members. The study finds that the increase in the retailer’s price after adopting IoT+BCT equals the average of the benefit of IoT+BCT in alleviating consumers’ concern and the unit variable cost. However, demand (or planned production amount) will only increase when the “net” benefit of IoT+BCT (defined as the difference between the concern alleviation benefit and the variable cost of IoT+BCT) is sufficiently high. Generally, the farm is more willing to adopt IoT+BCT than the retailer. The retailer is more likely to adopt the IoT+BCT when the quality of the agricultural product is higher. Through Nash bargaining based on revenue sharing, the likelihood of both agents concurrently adopting IoT+BCT is enhanced, leading to potential Pareto improvement. Numerical experiments are conducted in order to validate the theoretical results and to derive additional managerial insights.

Key words: agricultural supply chain, internet of things, blockchain, yield uncertainty, Nash bargaining